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Abstract
In this paper, we present a novel decentralised management technique that allows elec-
tricity micro-storage devices, deployed within individual homes as part of a smart electricity
grid, to converge to profitable and efficient behaviours. Specifically, we propose the use of
software agents, residing on the users’ smart meters, to automate and optimise the charging
cycle of micro-storage devices in the home to minimise its costs, and we present a study
of both the theoretical underpinnings and the implications of a practical solution, of us-
ing software agents for such micro-storage management. First, by formalising the strategic
choice each agent makes in deciding when to charge its battery, we develop a game-theoretic
framework within which we can analyse the competitive equilibria of an electricity grid pop-
ulated by such agents and hence predict the best consumption profile for that population
given their battery properties and individual load profiles. Our framework also allows us to
compute theoretical bounds on the amount of storage that will be adopted by the popula-
tion. Second, to analyse the practical implications of micro-storage deployments in the grid,
we present a novel algorithm that each agent can use to optimise its battery storage profile
in order to minimise its owner’s costs. This algorithm uses a learning strategy that allows
it to adapt as the price of electricity changes in real-time, and we show that the adoption
of these strategies results in the system converging to the theoretical equilibria. Finally,
we empirically evaluate the adoption of our micro-storage management technique within a
complex setting, based on the UK electricity market, where agents may have widely varying
load profiles, battery types, and learning rates. In this case, our approach yields savings of
up to 14% in energy cost for an average consumer using a storage device with a capacity of
less than 4.5 kWh and up to a 7% reduction in carbon emissions resulting from electricity
generation (with only domestic consumers adopting micro-storage and, commercial and
industrial consumers not changing their demand). Moreover, corroborating our theoretical
bound, an equilibrium is shown to exist where no more than 48% of households would wish
to own storage devices and where social welfare would also be improved (yielding overall
annual savings of nearly £1.5B).
1. Introduction
The vision of an intelligent electricity delivery network, commonly called the smart grid,
has been advocated as one of the main solutions to ensuring sustainable energy provision
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(US Department Of Energy, 2003; Galvin & Yeager, 2008; DECC, 2009). Such grids aim to
reduce inefficiencies in energy usage, minimise carbon emissions and reduce costs to generate
electricity. A key element of this vision is that consumers should be able to respond to the
current condition of the grid, by shifting or reducing their use of electricity, through a two-
way communication channel between them and the other actors in the system (i.e., suppliers,
other consumers, and grid operators). By so doing, it is expected that peaks in demand
can be reduced, which, in turn, would reduce the need for expensive and carbon-intensive
peaking plants (i.e., spinning reserve) that rely on fossil fuels.
Two of the key technical enablers of the smart grid are increased degrees of automation
and the ability to store energy. In the former case, consumers need to be able to delegate
the complex and time-consuming reasoning about shifting or reducing demand, subject
to their individual preference, to software agents that will act on their behalf (Ramchurn,
Vytelingum, Rogers, & Jennings, 2011c). To this end, smart meters have been developed to
provide consumers and their agents with real-time information about a home’s consumption
and the state of the grid, and to provide suppliers and grid operators with consumption
data from homes. Moreover, smart meter roll-outs have now been mandated in a number
of countries, including France (by 2016), Spain (by 2018) and the UK (by 2020). Through
such information feeds, consumers should be able to improve their management of energy
(e.g., switching off devices they do not need or rescheduling power-hungry devices to other
times). In the latter case, the agents can use the information to decide to store electricity
at times when overall demand from the grid is low (and generally cheaper) and re-use this
electricity when the grid is operating close to its limits (i.e., when generators are operating
near capacity or transmission lines are close to overload and electricity is generally more
expensive). Furthermore, storage devices can also be used to compensate for the variability
of many forms of renewable electricity generation (e.g., wind, wave, solar) that is likely to
be an increasingly prominent component of the future grid (Bathurst & Strbac, 2003).
To date, most research on storage technologies has focused on designing new low-cost
large-scale storage devices (with capacities of the order of 10-100MWh) that are able to
efficiently store electricity for long periods of time and allow a sufficient number of charg-
ing/discharging cycles without significant degradation in performance (Bathurst & Strbac,
2003). However, with the development of a large variety of micro-storage devices (i.e., with
capacities of the order of kWh) that can be installed in homes1 and vehicles2, a future
where large numbers of individual consumers can store small amounts of electricity in order
to accommodate peaks in demand and variability in supply will soon be possible. There
are, however, a number of potential challenges in this setting. First, if all consumers decide
to charge their batteries at the same time, because the price is low, a significant peak in
demand could well ensue. This would, in turn, result in higher electricity generation costs
and greater carbon emissions and could overload a system that is already operating close
to its maximum capacity (resulting in a brown-out or, in the worst case, a black-out). In-
deed, such unintended population-wide synchronisation has already been seen in real-world
1. See batteries recently developed by GS Yuasa (http://lithiumenergy.jp/en/products/) or Power Yiile
(http://eliiypower.co.jp/english/lithium-ion/).
2. Vehicle to grid (V2G) technologies enable energy to be stored in the batteries of electric vehicles (EVs)
(e.g., Mini-E or Nissan Leaf) or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) (e.g., Toyota Plug-in Prius or
Chevrolet Volt) (Sovacool & Hirsh, 2009; Lund & Kempton, 2008).
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demand-response trials where consumers manually react to critical pricing periods (Ham-
merstrom et al., 2008). Second, if consumers were to simply charge their batteries to ensure
they have sufficient energy to cover their whole demand across a day, they may end up
paying more than they need to. This is because it may be cheaper to use the grid-supplied
electricity at certain times, rather than the energy already stored in the battery. Finally, if
most homes in the system start using storage devices and manage to reduce peak demand
(by optimising their battery charging and usage costs), electricity prices may become lower
than the price of stored electricity (including the cost of the battery), thus voiding the need
for micro-storage and breaking down the market for such devices.
Addressing the aforementioned issues through the formulation of conventional closed-
form solutions (see Section 2 for more details) is challenged by the fact that the system
is composed of large numbers of distinct stakeholders (typically millions of consumers and
tens of market makers and network managers) operating in a completely decentralised fash-
ion where they individually act to satisfy their own particular objectives and constraints
(to supply or use energy) which may conflict (e.g., the network managers aim to minimise
peaks in demand while consumers aim to minimise their costs and use devices at the most
convenient time of the day). Against this background, the agent-based approach can be
used both as a framework to analyse the properties of such systems and also as an im-
plementation technology (Exarchakos, Leach, & Exarchakos, 2009; Houwing, Negenborn,
Heijnen, Schutter, & Hellendoorn, 2007; van Dam, Houwing, & Bouwmans, 2008; Rogers &
Jennings, 2010). In particular, game theory can be used to determine the properties of the
system as the multiple self-interested parties interact and software agents can be installed
on the smart meters to optimise the usage and storage profile of the house using information
from a variety of sources (e.g., weather data to predict heating needs and costs or price plan
data from suppliers). Now, most of the existing approaches to applying intelligent agents
study how individual homes could optimise the way they store energy or how storage de-
vices could coordinate with renewable energy generation facilities to maximise energy used
from such sources (see Section 2 for more details). However, in so doing, they ignore the
individual selfish preferences of each consumer and do not model well the real impact of
agents learning to adapt to the constraints that they themselves impose on the system. To
remedy this, it is crucial to devise an approach that focuses on the system dynamics where
all agents in the system are given the freedom to buy electricity whenever they see fit.
In this paper, we take just such an approach and provide both an analytical and a
practical solution to the decentralised control of micro-storage devices in the grid. Specif-
ically, we develop a game-theoretic framework for modelling storage devices in large-scale
systems where each device is controlled by a self-interested agent that aims to maximise its
monetary profits when a real-time price for electricity is provided by the grid. Using this
framework, under certain reasonable assumptions, we are able to predict the equilibria of
the system given that each agent behaves rationally (i.e., always adopts a storage profile
that minimises its costs) and only reacts to a price signal. Given this, we go on to devise
intelligent agent-based storage strategies that can learn the best storage profile given mar-
ket prices that are themselves a result of the aggregate storage and consumption profile of
all the agents in the system. Crucially, we show that agents using such strategies achieve
our predicted equilibria and, building upon this, we simulate large populations of agents in
order to predict the system behaviour under various conditions.
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In somewhat more detail, this work advances the state of the art in the following ways:
1. We provide a novel analytical game-theoretic framework that captures the synchronous
behaviours of consumers with micro-storage devices within the smart grid. We use
this to study electricity storage strategies that agents might adopt in a smart grid
with real-time pricing. Given the typical electricity usage profiles of consumers, we
are able to compute the competitive equilibria which describe when each individual
agent is going to charge its device, use its stored electricity, or use electricity from the
grid. We then use this analytical solution to benchmark our decentralised solution.
2. We provide a theoretical bound on the storage capacity that will be needed by the
population, as well as a bound on the portion of the population that will adopt storage.
3. We provide new micro-storage strategies that enable agents to learn the best storage
profile to adopt, even taking into account the probable heterogeneity of the other
micro-storage devices adopted by consumers across the grid (e.g., these devices will
vary in capacity and in how fast they can be charged or discharged). Our practical
strategies are shown to converge to the same competitive equilibria as those predicted
by our analytical framework and come with system-wide benefits that include reduced
carbon emissions, as well as cost savings.
4. We show how agents, having learnt their best storage profile, can also learn to buy
the most profitable storage capacity. Given this, using evolutionary game theoretic
analysis, we are able to predict the portion of the population that would actually
acquire such storage capacity to maximise their savings. We show that this is not the
entire population. Rather, it is just under half of them, confirming the theoretical
bounds that our analytical framework predicts.
In short, this is the first attempt at modelling, predicting equilibria and building intel-
ligent strategies for the problem of electricity storage on a large scale. Our approach also
justifies and provides the basis for the implementation of real-time electricity pricing for
domestic electricity distribution.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work in
the area of electricity storage and electricity markets. Section 3 discusses the key features of
such markets and lays down the general assumptions upon which we build our framework.
Section 4 presents our game-theoretic framework and shows how the competitive equilibria
of the system can be computed and, based on such equilibria, determines how many users
are likely to adopt micro-storage. Building on this, Section 5 describes the dynamics of a
market where agents are given the ability to learn their best storage profile and Section 6
empirically studies this system through simulations. Then, Section 7 expands on the cost-
benefit analysis of storage in a system given a heterogenous population of consumers with
different usage profiles. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
In this section, we first review current storage technologies to illustrate how micro-storage
has evolved to date and is likely to be a potent energy management technology in the
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future. We follow with a discussion of existing approaches in the power systems literature
to using storage, including agent-based approaches that have been proposed to manage the
grid in general and micro-storage in particular. Furthermore, we motivate the need to have
real-time pricing mechanisms in the grid in order to enable more responsive demand by
considering the response of consumers to fixed prices and time-of-use tariffs.
2.1 Energy Storage Technologies
The large scale storage of electricity within an electricity grid is not a new concept. Many
countries operate pumped-storage power plants which store electricity by pumping water
to a high reservoir when prices are low, and then release this water and use it to generate
electricity when prices are high or supply is short. For example, Dinorwig Power Station in
the UK can store approximately 10GWh of electricity, and can supply this stored energy
over six hours, while providing up to 1.8GW of power (Williams, 1984).
However, the increased need for storage capacity as electricity grids increasingly seek to
incorporate intermittent renewable sources, such as wind generation or solar power, coupled
with the high capital costs of such pumped storage plants and the limited number of suit-
able sites for their construction, mean that much recent research has focused on alternative
smaller storage solutions which typically store 10-100MWh of electricity. Examples of tech-
nologies that have already been demonstrated commercially include the use of underground
caverns to store electricity by compressing and releasing air (Swider, 2007) and its storage
in large chemical flow batteries (Shibata & Sato, 1999).
Most recently, attention has turned to micro-storage3 of up to 20kWh of electricity
which might be installed within homes as part of a smart grid roll-out. This interest has
been largely driven by the rapidly decreasing cost of efficient batteries, such as lithium-ion
cells or the nickel-zinc alternative, as they are developed for use within electric vehicles
(den Bossche, Vergels, Mierlo, Matheys, & Autenboer, 2006). Indeed, the energy storage
capacity required for a viable electric vehicle is close to the daily consumption of a home
(e.g., the Chevrolet Volt battery has a capacity of 16 kWh and the Nissan Leaf can store
up to 24 kWh). Thus, it is now possible to envisage that micro-storage devices will be
widely used in the short to medium term, either as dedicated home storage batteries, or as
an additional capability of electric vehicles.
2.2 Agent-Based Systems for the Grid
The use of software agents, residing on smart meters, was first envisaged by Schweppe,
Tabors, Kirtley, Outhred, Pickel, and Cox (1980) who proposed mechanisms for agents to
manage the use of electricity within a single home and to buy electricity in real-time on
behalf of their owner. Since then, a number of agent-based approaches have been developed
where multiple autonomous agents represent the interests of different actors on the grid.
For example, Ygge, Akkermans, Andersson, Krejic, and Boertjes (1999) initiated work on
abstracting electricity markets as multi-commodity markets and showed how agents trad-
3. Note that the average cost of a micro-storage battery today varies from around £300 to up to £1000
per kWh with an average start-up cost of £200. Note that these prices are only indicative and given
the innovative nature of the area and the investment in electric vehicle battery technology, the cost of
micro-storage is gradually decreasing (see http://www.pikeresearch.com).
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ing energy for different times of the day, could generate efficient allocations . Moreover,
Jennings, Corera, Laresgoiti, Mamdani, Perriolat, Skarek, and Varga (1996) developed coor-
dination mechanisms for different actors on the grid to manage the allocation of transmission
capacity and, more recently, Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) and Li and Tesfatsion (2009) devel-
oped agent-based electricity market simulations which incorporate transmission constraints
and different types of buyers and sellers in the grid. Kok and Venekamp (2010) take a simi-
lar approach and implement an agent-based architecture to run the electricity market where
the individual actors represent either generators or devices in the home. Note, however,
that none of these approaches consider the daily consumption profile of consumers, nor how
an agent might optimise its consumption and storage of electricity to maximise its owner’s
benefit. We believe this is crucial because agents have to be profitable to their users, each
with her own specific needs and lifestyle, in order to be commercially viable. Specifically,
agents should be able to provide personalised home energy management if they are to be
deployed in the real world.
In this context, we note the early work of Daryanian, Bohn, and Tabors (1989) that
illustrated how individual agents could optimise, through iterative algorithms, the load
profile of a house using an electricity storage device. Their approach was, however, limited
to considering very basic battery properties and did not consider wider issues for the grid
such as the level of adoption of batteries in the population and the optimum storage capacity
required for maximum savings. More recently, Houwing et al. (2007) provided algorithms for
agents to optimise storage using small domestic combined heat and power (CHP) plants, but
they ignored how populations of such agents would impact on the grid. On the other hand,
Exarchakos et al. (2009) and van Dam et al. (2008) have studied the application of storage
devices on a wider scale. They showed that using demand-side management techniques,
where the storage profile of a number of homes is controlled centrally, can increase savings
made in the system. Unfortunately, such a centralised approach automatically introduces a
single point of failure in the system and does not take into account the individual preferences
of each user to buy, use, or turn off her storage device. On the other hand, Ramchurn,
Vytelingum, Rogers, and Jennings (2011b) consider a supplier retailing to a large number
of agents that continuously optimise their storage, but they assume that the effect of such
large-scale optimisation does not influence the wholesale price of the market which is usually
not the case when considering a large enough proportion of the population. Thus, in
this paper, we take a market-based approach similar to Ygge et al. (1999) and Ygge and
Akkermans (1999), that is informationally decentralised (i.e., no centre with complete and
perfect information is required), and therefore more robust, where each agent buys electricity
in real-time markets and individually controls the storage profile of its associated home,
based on real-time prices that reflect the demand (and supply) of the market.
2.3 Electricity Pricing Mechanisms
Most of the above approaches assume the existence of a control signal that dictates when
the home must store and when it is best to use the stored electricity, thereby reducing the
load on the grid at peak times (see Figure 1 for an example of the average UK demand
that result in peaks) and making a saving when such reductions come with monetary re-
wards. To this end, Schweppe et al. (1980) proposed the use of real-time pricing (RTP)
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or spot pricing of electricity as a better way to manage demand as conditions on the grid
are accurately reflected by the price (as set by a single utility or an electricity market).
Thus, contrary to the pricing signals that are traditionally used in the grid, that are either
based on a fixed price or a time-of-use (TOU) price, whereby a premium is charged during
times of anticipated peak demand, a real-time price reflects the current and continuously
changing balance of supply capacity and demand and, even in some cases, the congestion on
the network (e.g., locational marginal pricing approaches to pricing electricity at different
points in the grid – see Harris, 2005). Unfortunately, Schweppe et al.’s solution was never
fully implemented on a large scale at the time it was proposed. This was for a number of
reasons. First, the properties of their solution were mainly proven analytically, under the
general assumption that most agents will behave in a similar fashion and did not attempt
to model the strategic choices that agents may make in charging their batteries (e.g., always
charging at times they predict will be cheaper and always using their battery when they
predict prices will be higher or charging their battery early for a whole day’s consumption
to avoid price peaks later). Instead, in this paper, we develop a game-theoretic framework
that fully captures the agent’s strategic behaviour within the context of the smart grid and
we complement this approach with simulations in order to evaluate the performance of the
system with a highly heterogeneous population of agents. Second, Schweppe et al.’s design
also came up against problems associated with high communication costs and a lack of
autonomous storage management technology. However, recent advances in computational
power that make the deployment of autonomous agents entirely feasible, and new informa-
tion and communication technologies such as wireless broadband internet and home energy
management systems (e.g., AlertMe4 or Intel’s Home energy dashboard5) mean that real-
time pricing for the domestic sector looks closer to being realised. Moreover, the financial
commitment of countries such as the UK (£8.6M invested in smart metering infrastructure
– see DECC, 2009) and the US (with 57.9 million smart meters planned for installation6) to
the implementation of smart metering infrastructure, provides unprecedented support for
the implementation of RTP.
Real-world trials, such as those of the GridWise alliance in the US (Hammerstrom et al.,
2008) or the Energy Demand Research Project in the UK (Smith, 2010), and theoretical
work such as those by Ramchurn, Vytelingum, Rogers, and Jennings (2011a) show that
the more accurate RTP signals (i.e., representing real costs as opposed to the TOU pricing
scheme) allow consumers to reduce their peak demand (and the duration of such peaks)
by reacting more frequently to a more accurate 30-min-tariff pricing model (rather than
over the peak and off-peak prices of TOU). By reducing such peaks, consumers under
RTP can make significant savings compared to those under the TOU pricing. However, it is
generally the case that more (short-duration) peaks exist in the RTP than the Fixed-Pricing
model (see Ramchurn et al., 2011, where two long-duration peaks exist in the morning and
evening), requiring the usage of expensive peaking plants only for short periods. This is
because if the agents predict (based on previous days) a low price for the next day at a
4. http://www.alertme.com/.
5. http://edc.intel.com/Applications/Energy-Solutions/Home-Energy-Management/.
6. http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/
57-9-million-smart-meters-currently-planned-for-installation-in-the-united-states
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Figure 1: Average load profile (weekday in summer) in UK over half-hourly periods based
on a fixed pricing model.
certain time, they will all turn on their devices, which then results in a peak in demand at
that time. When such a mechanism is rolled out on a large scale, such reactive behaviours
can cause unpredictable and significant peaks (compared to two predictable ones for TOU)
in demand and prices, which, in turn, result in higher costs for individuals and greater stress
on grid resources (transmission lines reaching their thermal limit and generators reaching
their capacity).
Thus, if not properly managed, storage systems can be unprofitable for consumers and
adversely impact the whole system (Holland, 2009; Williams & Wright, 1991; Bathurst &
Strbac, 2003). Hence, in the setting we consider, it is important to know whether micro-
storage can be individually beneficial and what strategies maximise the consumer’s savings.
It is also important to understand the system-wide effects of such strategies; in particular,
quantifying the limits on the usefulness of small scale storage from a grid efficiency point of
view and determining how different types of storage (with different costs and efficiencies)
will be integrated into the system. These are the key open questions that are addressed by
this paper (see Sections 4 and 5 respectively).
3. Model Description
As already noted, in this paper we seek to analyse the behaviour and impact of micro-
storage devices from a large scale multi-agent systems point of view. That is, we consider
the situation where large numbers of autonomous agents each control energy storage for a
home, and interact with electricity suppliers within a market, with the aim of minimising
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costs for their individual owners. Such a setup allows us to make a number of modelling
assumptions, which we will detail in this section. Our analysis considers fixed time intervals
consisting of single days, each separated into T = 48 settlement periods of half an hour. Each
day, agents consume electricity which is bought from suppliers through an electricity market.
This market operates for each time interval in the day, so that variations in demand over
time can be met. The agents autonomously control the charging and discharging behaviour
of their storage device in order to maximise their user’s profit. We describe this process
more thoroughly in Section 3.1. In our analysis, the market itself is modelled abstractly,
following a macro-model which we give details of in Section 3.2. In order to measure the
impact of the behaviour of energy storage agents in a wider context, we employ a number
of metrics for grid efficiency that are described and explained in Section 3.3. For a table of
notation definitions used throughout this paper, see Table 1.
3.1 Agents
We consider a set of N consumers, A, which we define as self-interested agents that always
aim to minimise their individual costs. Each agent a ∈ A has a load profile7 !ai ∀i ∈ I =
{1, . . . , T}, such that !ai is the amount of electricity required by agent a for time interval
i during each day. The aggregate load profile of the system is given by
∑
a∈A !
a
i = !i.
We consider this load profile to be fixed over different days (although in practice there are
seasonal variations in demand, there is a high degree of consistency from day to day). Each
agent a ∈ A may also have some storage available to it, with capacity κa, efficiency ηa
and running costs µa. Here, the cost µa represents the ongoing storage costs (for example,
some battery devices expend energy through heating while they are in use or lose efficiency
through the depletion of chemicals used in them). We do not incorporate any fixed capital
investment by a at this stage, as these costs are fixed, and only the running costs can
have any effect on which storage profile is most profitable. However, such fixed capital
investments are important when users decide whether or not to purchase a battery, and we
include them in the cost-benefit analysis in Section 7. The storage efficiency ηa and running
cost µa are modelled to be such that if c amount of energy is stored, then only ηac may be
discharged and the storage cost is µac.
In order to minimise costs, agent a can attempt to strategise over its storage profile,
bai ∀i ∈ I, where for all i ∈ I, bai = cai − dai , where cai = (bai )+ is the charging profile and
dai = (b
a
i )
−, is the discharging profile. Here, and throughout the paper, we use the notation
(·)+ to denote positive part, that is, y = (x)+ means y = x if x > 0, y = 0 otherwise.
Likewise we use (x)− to denote (−x)+. These definitions implicitly assume that a user
will not both charge and discharge her storage device over a single time interval. However,
in our model, prices are fixed over each time interval, so we discount such behaviour as
it can never be profitable. For each agent a, a feasible storage profile bai ∀i ∈ I must
satisfy −Da ≤ bai ≤ Ca, where Da is the maximum discharging rate of the storage device,
7. We assume that the consumer’s load is inelastic and, thus, insensitive to price changes. In reality, we
would expect that the consumer’s load shows slight elasticity, i.e., the consumer will reduce her demand
if price increases and likewise increase her demand if price decreases. However, because demand elasticity
of domestic consumers is generally small, we believe that the results presented in this paper still provide
a good guide to the behaviour of real markets.
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Notation Definition
N Number of agents in the system
A Set of all agents in the system
T Number of time intervals in a day
I Set of time intervals
bai Net charge/discharge from storage device of agent a during time period i
cai Amount charged by agent a during time period i
dai Amount discharged by agent a during time period i
!ai Electricity used by agent a during time period i
qai Electricity purchased by agent a during time period i
ηa Efficiency of storage device for agent a
κa Capacity of storage device for agent a
µa Storage cost for agent a
ca0 Energy agent a has stored at the start of the day
Ca Maximum (per interval) charge for agent a
Da Maximum (per interval) discharge for agent a
Oai Maximum usable discharge for agent a during i
bi Net charge/discharge by all agents during i
ci Amount charged by all agents during i
di Amount discharged by all agents during i
!i Total consumer load by all agents during i
qi Total electricity purchased by all agents for i
κ Total storage capacity of the population
η Homogeneous storage device efficiency
µ Homogeneous storage costs
C Maximum total per interval charge
D Maximum total per interval discharge
Oi Maximum total useful discharge during i
s Supply function for wholesale market
pi Price of electricity during i
p+ Charging price point
p− Discharging price point
Φi(·),Ψi(·) Equilibrium price functions for time interval i (see Definition 1)
(·)+ Positive part
(·)− Negative part
LU Low-end energy users
HU High-end energy users
r Agent’s strategy to adopt or not storage
piUr Probability of an agent of type U ∈ {LU,HU} adopting strategy r
uU (·, ·, ·) Payoff of an agent of type U ∈ {LU,HU}
Table 1: Notation definitions.
774
Theoretical and Practical Foundations of Agent-Based Micro-Storage
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
x 104
0
50
100
150
200
250
Total Demand (MW)
Un
it P
ric
e 
(G
BP
/M
W
h)
UK Wholesale Balancing Market Buy Price (GBP/MWh)
 
 
Price against Demand
Moving−average
Figure 2: Half-hourly UK wholesale real-time buy prices (in the balancing market) plotted
against total demand for August and September 2009 illustrating the correlation
between price and demand. The dotted line represents the average of the points.
and Ca, the maximum charging rate. Since we are attempting to model the effect of the
widespread adoption of micro-storage devices, we can assume that !ai , C
a, and Da are small
in comparison to !i (since we are considering an electricity grid consisting of a large number
of consumers). We denote the total storage capacity as κ =
∑
a∈A κ
a, and the net storage
profile as bi ∀i ∈ I where bi =
∑
a∈A b
a
i . For each i ∈ I and a ∈ A we use qai = bai + !ai , to
denote the net quantity of electricity purchased by a during i, and we use qi = bi + !i to
denote the net quantity of electricity purchased by all users during interval i. The aggregate
maximum charging and discharging rates are defined as C =
∑
a∈AC
a and D =
∑
a∈AD
a.
We also define the maximum usable storage output Oi to be the maximum amount of stored
electricity that the whole population of agents is able to discharge and make use of during
time interval i. If agents can only use stored electricity to satisfy their own energy needs,
then we have that Oi =
∑
a∈Amin(D
a, !ai ) for all i ∈ I, as each agent has no reason to
discharge more energy than its current load. This is the situation that we mainly focus on
in this paper. However, the analysis we present can also be applied to the case where agents
can sell stored energy back to the grid, using a feed-in tariff. If we assume that agents can
sell stored energy at the current grid price, then our model remains the same, except for
the values of Oi which should be set equal to D, for all i ∈ I. To satisfy its load profile
and energy charging needs, each agent must purchase electricity from the available market,
which we describe in the next subsection.
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3.2 A Macro-Model of the Electricity Market
In order for widespread home energy storage to effectively help reduce peak loads and im-
prove the overall efficiency of the electricity market, there must be some incentive for users
to charge their storage devices when demand is low (or when renewable energy generators
are running cheaply) and discharge them when demand is high (or when expensive peaking
plants are used). As discussed in Section 2.3, both TOU and RTP pricing plans aim to in-
centivise users to optimise their demand by shifting to low demand periods. In particular,
by sending up to date pricing information, RTP allows electricity suppliers to provide con-
sumers with prices that accurately reflect current levels of demand and costs of generating
that electricity. Hence, in our analysis, we focus on the use of RTP, and note that competi-
tion between suppliers that provide RTP pricing schemes should allow future consumers to
buy electricity at or close to the current market price (Schweppe, 1988). Although the use of
RTP makes the settlement process more complex than in the case of Fixed or TOU pricing
(as these are independent of the reaction of the agents), and requires more interactive and
intelligent energy management in the home, recent advances in smart metering technology
have meant that RTP has become a plausible and attractive possibility for future smart
electricity grids (as discussed in Section 2.2). Accordingly, we assume agents buy electricity
under an RTP scheme where the price of electricity accurately represents the market price
for power at that particular settlement period.
To this end, we consider a macro-model of the electricity market that abstracts the
actual market mechanism and trading that determines the real-time price of electricity.
Such an approach to modelling the supply side and the transmission system is common in
the power system economics literature as it does not significantly affect the general trends
observed when analysing the demand side (Kirschen & Strbac, 2004; Schweppe, 1988). Our
model is based on the observation that as the aggregate demand for electricity increases,
the unit price of that electricity will also increase, since more costly means of generation
must be used to satisfy this additional demand. For example, Figure 2 shows the half-hour
UK real-time wholesale buy prices (in the balancing market) during August and September
2009 plotted against aggregate demand.8 While there are numerous anomalies due to power
station outages that cause short term price increases, it is clear that over a large range of
demand, there is an increasing trend in the relationship between the unit cost of electricity
and the total aggregate demand, with prices rising rapidly for very high demand. An
analysis of the effect of these price fluctuations on a system with micro-storage is left for
future work.
In several countries around the world, including the UK and the US, electricity is traded
in wholesale for residential, commercial and industrial purposes in forward markets (up to
several months in advance) and in the balancing market (in real-time). Within this setup,
the role of suppliers is to buy electricity from the generators on the wholesale market (e.g.,
the National Grid runs the wholesale market in the UK and PJM runs the one on the east
coast of the US) and sell retail to its consumers. In the UK, the retail market is dominated
by six large suppliers that retail to 26 million residential consumers (representing around
30% of all of UK energy demand). Now, in this work, we focus exclusively on these domestic
consumers since they constitute of a significant portion of the overall energy consumption
8. The data is available at www.bmreports.com.
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in the UK. Yet, our approach could readily be extended to the other commercial and
industrial consumers. This is in line with our main aim to show that the deployment of
micro-storage within a large heterogeneous population can have significant benefits. Thus,
demonstrating that we can flatten the demand of the heterogeneous domestic population
implies that a similar behaviour should be achievable across the remaining 70% of the
population (with even larger benefits). To this end, we model the domestic consumer
market with a pricing function that reflects the expected cost that a supplier (retailing
electricity to the consumers) would pay from the wholesale market. There are several
advantages for a supplier to having an aggregate demand with fewer peaks from its domestic
consumers. Specifically, the supplier’s exposure to peak (and typically volatile) wholesale
prices is reduced and it can benefit more from long-term baseload (i.e., long-term flat load)
forward contracts (Voice, Vytelingum, Ramchurn, Rogers, & Jennings, 2011). Furthermore,
the peak load on transmission and distribution networks may be curtailed, reducing the need
for infrastructure reinforcements, and most significantly, expensive peaking plant capacity
(which may only be used for a few hours each day) can also be downsized.
Against this background, in our model, the real-time price of electricity per kWh
(£/kWh) is specified by a price function s(q) = 0.04 + 0.20(q/0.6N)γ where qkWh is the
total energy required by the N = |A| consumers during a half-hour time slot and γ is set
to 4 to model the typical trend (i.e., monotonically and rapidly increasing) of the wholesale
demand prices at which the suppliers purchase their electricity. Note that as long as the
modelled demand curve is monotonically increasing to reflect the increasing unit cost of
electricity with demand (which incentivises demand response), the actual demand curve is
not critical to our work.
Given this function, the retail price depends on the total amount of electricity consumed
by the agents, !i, and the net discharging and charging of the agents’ storage devices, bi, such
that the total amount of electricity bought from suppliers at time interval i is qi = !i + bi,
and the market price is given by pi = s(qi). Hence, each agent a pays pi× (!ai + bai ) and the
total cost for all agents is piqi.
3.3 Grid Performance Metrics
A key aim of this paper is to study the effect of storage on the overall system and whether
the global performance of the system improves as agents adopt it. In more detail, we
measure performance by considering the following standard metrics of an electricity market
(Harris, 2005):
• The load factor (LF) is the average power divided by peak power, over a period of
time:
LF =
∑
i∈I qi
|I|×maxi∈I qi
where I ⊆ I is a selected period of time (e.g., a day). Ideally, the LF should be at
its maximum of 1 which means the aggregate load profile is completely flat. When
LF < 1 it suggests variations in demand through each daily period. Hence, if storage
strategies are effective, the LF should converge to 1 when agents are able to utilise
storage to shift consumption at peak time to periods of low demand. The LF on its
own only measures the aggregate load profile and does not indicate how individual
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agents contribute to peaks in the system (e.g., if all agents are consuming at the same
time or if only a few agents cause large peaks). To better capture such behaviours we
rely on the following measure, the diversity factor.
• The diversity factor (DF) is the ratio of the sum of the individual maximum demands
of various consumers of the system to the maximum demand of the complete system:
DF =
∑
a∈Amaxi∈I q
a
i
maxi∈I qi
The DF is always greater than or equal to 1 and the higher its value, the less correlated
the peak demands of consumers are. Less correlated peaks result in a flat aggregate
profile (as peaks are interposed), and a high DF implies that users are well diversified
and so will not cause large aggregate peaks (by all consuming at the same time) in
the system. On the other hand, a low DF indicates that agents have more correlated
load profiles which could result in peaks in demand. Now, while the LF describes the
aggregate demand, the DF describes how the individual demands compare with each
other and, thus, the DF can give insights into how the LF is achieved (i.e., how the
individual profiles are contributing to the aggregate profiles). For example, for the
same high LF, a high DF suggests well diversified profiles with individual consumer
peaks spread across the day while a low DF suggests flatter individual profiles. The
DF is generally useful when designing decentralised control mechanisms because it
identifies the individual (rather than the aggregate) behaviours of the agents and,
thus, potentially provides insights on how the individual behaviour of an agent should
be modified.
• The grid carbon intensity is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted in order to deliver
one unit of electricity to the consumer. It is expressed as grams of CO2 per kWh and,
ideally should be as low as possible (in order to minimise greenhouse gas emission).
The carbon intensity of the UK grid for half-hourly periods for August and September
2009 is shown in Figure 3. As with the market price of the electricity, there is again
a clear correlation between the carbon intensity of the electricity from the grid, and
the total demand on the grid. In the UK, this is due to the use of coal-fired power
stations to satisfy increasing demand, and thus, as well as reducing the total cost of
electricity to the consumer, we can expect the use of micro-storage to reduce total
carbon emissions by reducing the overall carbon intensity of the grid.
We note here that our pricing model depends on the aggregate demand in the domestic
sector. Thus, when we report load factor and diversity factor results, we only do so for
this domestic sector. However, in reality, the domestic sector is only one contributor to
the total electricity demand; in the UK, it represents, as previously mentioned, approxi-
mately 30% of the total demand, with the remaining 70% being commercial and industrial
consumption which remains unchanged within our model. To demonstrate the potential of
domestic micro-storage to reduce UK carbon emissions from electricity generation, when
we present our results regarding carbon emissions reductions, we describe the reduction of
carbon emissions (as a result of micro-storage in the domestic sector) as a percentage of the
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Figure 3: Half-hour UK grid carbon intensity plotted against total demand for August and
September 2009 illustrating the correlation between carbon intensity and demand.
current carbon emission from all sources (i.e., domestic, commercial and industrial), assum-
ing micro-storage in the domestic sector and no change in the remaining 70% of commercial
and industrial daily profiles.
4. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Micro-Storage
Having set the stage for the application of micro-storage in the smart grid, we now explore
the theoretical underpinnings of such a system. To this end, we apply a game-theoretic
framework to the models given above and characterise the resulting equilibria. These equi-
libria are important because they represent stable states of the system under which each
agent is unable to increase its profitability by unilaterally changing its strategy. In partic-
ular, we can expect selfish agents to maintain battery usage strategies that are maximally
profitable for them, and thus, these are the states that we predict will arise naturally if the
market prices stabilise. We address the question of how to endow individual agents with
the intelligence to reach a stable equilibrium while maximising their owner’s savings later
in the paper (see Section 5). For now, to ensure tractability we assume that agents have
homogeneous efficiency and running costs, that is ηa = η and µa = µ for all a ∈ A for some
η and µ. While such assumptions allow us to obtain closed-formed solutions to computing
the equilibria in the system, they abstract from real-world systems where agents are typi-
cally heterogeneous. However, as one of the key achievements of this work, in Section 6 we
show that such assumptions do not result in a significant loss of generality and that, in fact,
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our theoretical results closely approximate the empirical results we obtain in more complex
environments with heterogeneous agents.
Formally, the game we consider has players which coincide with our agents, a ∈ A, and
the game describes the outcome of a single 24 hour interval. The pay-off an agent receives
is equal to minus the total costs that it experiences when purchasing electricity that day,
−∑i∈I(pi(!ai + bai ) + µcai ). The strategy space available to each agent is the set of feasible
storage profiles, bai ∀i ∈ I. We approximate the space of feasible aggregate storage profiles
to be the set of aggregate profiles which lie between the charging and discharging limits such
that the total amount of energy charged is less than or equal to the total storage capacity
available to the agents and exactly equal to the total amount of energy discharged divided
by the efficiency. More formally we consider the set of aggregate storage profiles bi ∀i ∈ I
such that −Oi ≤ bi ≤ C,
∑
i∈I di =
∑
i∈I ηci and
∑
i∈I ci ≤ κ, where κ is the storage
capacity (see Table 1 for notation).
Requiring that the total amount charged is less than the total storage capacity is a
stricter constraint than simply requiring that the capacity is never exceeded at any time.
However, it is a reasonable model of storage capacity limitations for a day-long time period
(given the daily-cyclic nature of demand), where demand typically goes through a single
cycle of low to high to low, implying that storage devices would go through a correspond-
ing cycle of charging to discharging to charging. Indeed, in practice, we find that at the
equilibria of our simulations, there is indeed a single charging and discharging cycle during
which prices cycle from low to high. Furthermore, the equilibria reached in our experiments
closely agree with the equilibria predicted in this section (see Subsection 6.3).
We are also making a further approximation in considering all aggregate profiles which
satisfy the aggregate capacity, charging and discharging constraints. Even if the aggregate
constraints are satisfied, this does not necessarily mean that there exist feasible strategies
for individual agents that give this aggregate profile. To give an example, this would be
a poor model if all agents had the same values for Ca, Da and !ai but there was a single
agent who was in possession of the majority of the storage capacity. In considering this
set of aggregate profiles we are therefore assuming that storage capacity is distributed
evenly amongst agents, roughly in proportion to their loads and charging and discharging
capacities. This is not unreasonable given the context of the situation we are modelling.
We now proceed to characterise the competitive equilibria for this game.
4.1 Competitive Equilibria as Global Optimisers
The set of competitive equilibria for the system corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria
under the assumption that each individual has negligible market power. That is, we assume
that each agent’s electricity consumption has a negligible effect on the price of electricity,
and we seek situations where no agent has an incentive to change its storage profile to
reduce its cost. We choose to analyse these equilibria as they capture the steady state of a
real system consisting of domestic users each owning micro-storage (optimised by an agent)
and where each user’s consumption has minimal effect on electricity prices (in the UK, each
user represents just one home out of 26 million).
Now, suppose agents have chosen some strategy profiles, and let us consider the effect
of a feasible change in strategy for one agent. That is, some agent a ∈ A considers a change
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for each i ∈ I, changing cai to cai +∆cai and dai to dai +∆dai , giving a net change from bai to
bai +∆b
a
i where ∆b
a
i = ∆c
a
i −∆dai . The change in payoff for agent a would be:∑
i∈I
(
s(qi)− s(qi +∆bai )
)
(!ai + b
a
i ) +
(
s(qi +∆b
a
i )∆b
a
i + µ∆c
a
i
)
. (1)
As noted in the previous section, since we are examining widespread micro-storage, we
can assume that for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A, !ai , Ca, and Da are small in comparison to !i and
qi. This is equivalent to assuming each agent has negligible market power. Thus, s(qi+∆bai )
will be very close to s(qi) and the first term in the above will be small. So, the change in
payoff for agent a would be approximately:∑
i∈I
(
s(qi)∆b
a
i + µ∆c
a
i
)
. (2)
This is equal to the dot product of the gradient times the vector of changes (∆c,∆d), for
the following function, f(·), 9 which we define as,
f
({cai , dai }a∈A,i∈I) =∑
i∈I
(∫ qi
0
s(x)dx+ µci
)
. (3)
Thus, the condition that each agent has no incentive to change their strategy is approxi-
mately equivalent to saying that for all a ∈ A, the directional derivative of f(·) is positive in
any direction of change that leads to a feasible storage profile. This is equivalent to saying
that a vector of storage profiles is a local minimum for f(·) over the set of all feasible stor-
age profiles. Since s(·) is increasing, f(·) must be convex, and since the feasible domain is
closed and convex, all local minimums are also global minimums for that domain. Thus, the
deterministic competitive equilibria for this game correspond to vectors of strategy profiles
which minimise f(·) over the set of feasible strategy profiles.
These approximations are typically well suited (i.e., do not result in a significant loss
of accuracy) to the large systems we consider (with millions of agents) and they have the
effect of greatly reducing our search for the competitive equilibrium of a complex multi-
player game to a relatively straightforward constrained optimisation problem — that of
minimising f(·). We now proceed to find solutions to this optimisation problem.
4.2 Characterisation of the Competitive Equilibria
We can now characterise the aggregate storage profiles which form optimal solutions to the
constrained optimisation problem given above. This characterisation is given in our main
result, Theorem 1. However, this theorem may seem somewhat unintuitive at first. We can
think of the equilibrium as being characterised by two prices, p+ and p− (defined below).
The equilibrium strategy is then to always charge as much as possible when energy is cheap,
right up to the point where the price reaches p+, and to always discharge when energy prices
are high, right up until they fall to p−. Thus, for any interval i, if at equilibrium, pi < p+,
then all agents must be at their maximum charge rates and if pi > p−, then all agents must
9. There is no real world counterpart to f(·), and so little intuition for its definition – it is not necessarily
equal to the total revenue, for example. It is simply a tool to help characterise global equilibrium.
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be at their maximum output rates. If, at equilibrium, pi lies strictly between p+ and p−,
then the energy is too expensive to be worth charging, but too cheap to make discharging
profitable, and so no storage activity occurs for that time interval.
In order to formally state and prove this result, we must begin with a definition:
Definition 1. For a storage system as described, for each interval i, let us define the
functions Φi(·) and Ψi(·) to be,
Φi(p) = min
(
C, (s−1(p)− !i)+
)
,
Ψi(p) = min
(
Oi, (s
−1(p)− !i)−
)
.
That is, Φi(p) is the amount of electricity that would have to be charged during interval
i, if there were no discharging, in order for the resulting price to be as close to p as possible.
Similarly, Ψi(p) is the amount of electricity that would have to be discharged during interval
i, if there were no charging, in order for the resulting price to be as close to p as possible.
Oi is the maximum useful discharge during i and C, the maximum daily total charge.
We define the discharging price point, p−, to be the maximum of the union of the
solutions to: ∑
i∈I
Ψi(p
−) = η
∑
i∈I
Φi(ηp
− − µ),
and the solutions to: ∑
i∈I
Ψi(p
−) = ηκ,
if such exist. This maximum exists because s(·) is continuous and strictly increasing.
If p− is well defined, then we also define the charging price point, p+, to be ηp− − µ if∑
i∈I
Ψi(p
−) < ηκ,
or equal to the minimal solution to: ∑
i∈I
Φi(p
+) = κ,
if such exist, otherwise.
Note, if p− and p+ are well defined then either p+ = ηp− − µ and ∑i∈I Ψi(p−) =
η
∑
i∈I Φi(p
+), or
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−) = ηκ, and
∑
i∈I Φi(p
+) = κ. In the latter case, since p+ is
strictly greater than all solutions to
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp
−−µ), and since the Φi(·)
functions are increasing and the Ψi(·) functions are decreasing, we must have that:
η
∑
i∈I
Φi(p
+) = ηκ =
∑
i∈I
Ψi(p
−) < η
∑
i∈I
Φi(ηp
− − µ),
and so p+ < ηp− − µ. Under our intuitive understanding of the equilibrium given above,
this means that, p− and p+ are chosen so that the total amount discharged is equal to the
total amount charged times η. Furthermore, under this restriction, either p− and p+ are
chosen to maximise the total amount charged or else the total amount charged is equal to
κ.
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Lemma 1. There always exists a solution to
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp−µ). Furthermore,
if p is the maximal solution then p− = p and p+ = ηp−µ unless ∑i∈I Ψi(p) > ηκ, in which
case, p− is the maximal solution to
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−) = ηκ, and p+ is the minimal solution to∑
i∈I Φi(p
+) = κ.
Proof. We have that s(·) is a continuous, strictly increasing function, and !i > 0 is inside
its range for each time interval i. Thus, if p is sufficiently small, then for all i ∈ I we
will have s−1(p) < !i and hence Ψi(p) will be strictly positive and, since ηp − µ < p,
Φi(ηp − µ) will be zero. Likewise if p is sufficiently large then for all i ∈ I we will have
s−1(p) > !i and so Φi(p) will be strictly positive and Ψi((p+ µ)/η) will be zero. Since the
functions Ψi(·) are decreasing for all i and Φi(·) are increasing for all i, we can conclude that∑
i∈I Ψi(p)− η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp− µ) is a continuous decreasing function in p which is negative
for sufficiently small p and positive for sufficiently large p. This implies the existence of
some solution p such that
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp− µ). Let p be the maximal solution
to this.
Now if
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) ≤ ηκ then, since the Ψi(·) functions are decreasing, there can be no
p′ > p such that
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
′) = ηκ. Thus, p− = p and, so, p+ = ηp − µ = ηp− − µ. If∑
i∈I Ψi(p) > ηκ then, since
∑
i∈I Ψi(·) is a decreasing function that eventually reaches
zero, it must cross ηκ. Thus, there will be a maximal value for p− such that
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−) =
ηκ. Similarly, since
∑
i∈I Φi(p) > κ, there must exist a minimal value for p
+ such that∑
i∈I Φi(p
+) = κ, as required.
Although we have specified p− so that it is the maximum solution to
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−) =
η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp
− − µ), if ∑i∈I Ψi(p−) < ηκ, it is worth noting that for any two values p
and p′ that satisfy
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp − µ) and
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
′) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp
′ −
µ), by the monotonicity on both sides of the equation, we must have that for all i ∈ I,
Ψi(p) = Ψi(p′) and Φi(p) = Φi(p′). Likewise, if
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) =
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
′) or
∑
i∈I Φi(p) =∑
i∈I Φi(p
′) then for all i ∈ I, Ψi(p) = Ψi(p′) or Φi(p) = Φi(p′) respectively. Indeed, with
these observations in mind, the specifications that maximal solutions be chosen makes no
difference to our main result, and is done simply so that p+ and p− are well defined.
We can now state and prove the main result of this analysis.
Theorem 1. For a storage system as described, if η < 1 or µ > 0 then the set of competitive
equilibria for the system is precisely the set of feasible agent strategies where, for all i ∈ I,
ci = Φi(p+) and di = Ψi(p−). In the case where storage devices are perfectly efficient and
costless, (η = 1 and µ = 0), the set of competitive equilibria for the system is precisely the
set of feasible agent strategies where, for all i ∈ I, bi = Φi(p+)−Ψi(p−).
Proof. We seek to find an aggregate storage profile, which minimises f(·) where:
f
({ci, di}i∈I) =∑
i∈I
(∫ "i+ci−di
0
s(x)dx+ µci
)
.
Since the set of feasible aggregate storage profiles is closed and bounded, there must be at
least one minimum of f(·) over this domain. However, since this domain is convex, and
f(·) is a convex function, the only local minima will be a convex set of global minima.
To find these optimal allocations, we seek feasible aggregate storage profiles for which the
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derivative of f(·) is non-negative in every direction that leads to another feasible allocation.
We can calculate that for all i ∈ I, ∂f/∂ci = pi + µ and ∂f/∂di = pi. Thus it remains to
characterise all feasible profiles such that:∑
i∈I
(pi + µ)∆ci + pi∆di ≥ 0,
for every vector of small changes that lead to another feasible aggregate storage profile, that
is, all ∆c,∆d such that {ci +∆ci, di +∆di}i∈I is feasible.
Now suppose we have some storage profile, (c, d), which locally minimises f(·). If there
are time intervals i, j with C > ci > 0 and C > cj > 0, then it would be feasible to increase
ci and decrease cj by an equal quantity, (or vice versa), hence we must have pi = pj . From
this we can deduce that if for some i, j, pi < pj , ci > 0 and cj > 0, then we must have
ci = C. So, if we let pˆ+ be the maximum of pj for time intervals j with cj > 0, we get that
for all intervals i such that ci > 0, pi ≤ pˆ+, and if pi < pˆ+, then ci must equal C. Similarly,
we can show that if pˆ− is the minimum of pj for time intervals j such that dj > 0 then for
all intervals i that di > 0, pi ≥ pˆ−, and if pi > pˆ− then di = Oi.
Furthermore, there cannot be i, j such that pi + µ > ηpj and ci > 0 and dj > 0, for
then it would be feasible and profitable to decrease ci by some ∆ci and increase dj by
∆dj = η∆ci. Hence, we must have pˆ+ + µ ≤ ηpˆ−. In particular, pˆ+ ≤ pˆ−, with this
inequality being strict if µ > 0 or η < 1, in which case, for all intervals i ∈ I at most one
of ci and di can be non-zero.
For each interval i, if pi > pˆ−, then di = Oi and ci = 0, so s−1(pi) − !i = −Oi and
thus, s−1(pˆ−)− !i < −Oi as s−1(·) is an increasing function. This means that bi = −Oi =
−Ψi(pˆ−). On the other hand, if pi = pˆ− then bi = s−1(pˆ−) − !i = −Ψi(pˆ−). Likewise,
for each interval i, if pi < pˆ+, then ci = C and di = 0, and so s−1(pi) − !i = C and so
Φ(pˆ+) = C = bi, and if pi = pˆ+ then bi = Φi(pˆ+), directly. If pi lies strictly between pˆ−
and pˆ+ then both ci and di must equal 0, and so s−1(pi)− !i = 0. Thus, s−1(pˆ−)− !i ≥ 0
and s−1(pˆ+)− !i ≤ 0, and so Φi(pˆ+) = Ψi(pˆ−) = 0. These results show that for all prices,
at equilibrium we must have bi = Φi(pˆ+)−Ψi(pˆ−). As stated above, if η < 1 or µ > 0, then
for each time interval i, at most one of ci and di can be non-zero, and so, in this case we
can specify, ci = Φi(pˆ+) and di = Ψi(pˆ−).
Since
∑
i∈I Ψi(pˆ
−) = η
∑
i∈I Φi(pˆ
+) and pˆ++µ ≤ ηpˆ−, we must have that∑i∈I Ψi(pˆ−) ≤
η
∑
i∈I Φi(ηpˆ
− − µ) and so, any solution to ∑i∈I Ψi(p) = η∑i∈I Φi(ηp − µ) must satisfy
p ≤ pˆ−, by the monotonicity of both sides of this equation. Furthermore, for any such p,
we would have
∑
i∈I Ψi(p) ≥
∑
i∈I Ψi(pˆ
−), meaning that
∑
i∈I Φi(ηp − µ) ≥
∑
i∈I Φi(pˆ
+)
which implies that ηp−µ ≤ pˆ+. It would also mean that, since∑i∈I di =∑i∈I Ψi(pˆ−) ≤ ηκ,
by the capacity constraint, we must have
∑
i∈I Ψi(pˆ
−) ≤∑i∈I Ψi(p−). Similarly, we must
also have that
∑
i∈I Φi(pˆ
+) ≤∑i∈I Φi(p+).
Now, suppose that
∑
i∈I Φi(pˆ
+) <
∑
i∈I Φi(p
+). This would also imply that
∑
i∈I Ψi(pˆ
−) <∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−). Hence, there would have to exist some intervals i, j with s−1(pˆ+) ≤ !i <
s−1(p+) and s−1(pˆ−) ≥ !j > s−1(p−). However, that would imply that, in our equilibrium
state, ci = di = 0, dj = cj = 0. Hence we would have pi < p+ and pj > p−, meaning that
pi + µ < ηpj and that it would be profitable to increase ci by some ∆ci and increase dj by
∆dj = η∆ci. This implies a contradiction, since for a small enough change, this would lead
to a feasible storage profile.
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Hence we must have that
∑
i∈I Φi(pˆ
+) =
∑
i∈I Φi(p
+) and
∑
i∈I Ψi(pˆ
−) =
∑
i∈I Ψi(p
−).
However, since these functions are monotonic, we must have that for all i, Φi(pˆ+) = Φi(p+)
and Ψi(pˆ−) = Ψi(p−). Thus, our equilibrium must satisfy the conditions in the statement
of this theorem.
Thus, there exists at least one minimiser of f(·) over the feasible domain, and any
minimiser of f(·) must satisfy the conditions given in the statement of the theorem. Fur-
thermore, the conditions given in the statement of the theorem are sufficiently strict as
to specify f(·) precisely. Thus, any feasible storage profile which satisfies the conditions
given in the statement of the theorem must minimise f(·) over the feasible domain, as
required.
A direct consequence of this theorem and the prior observations is that no matter what
the storage capacity is, the aggregate amount charged during the day is bounded above by:∑
i∈I
Φi(ηp− µ),
for p equal to any solution to: ∑
i∈I
Ψi(p) = η
∑
i∈I
Φi(ηp− µ).
If the storage capacity is greater than this amount, then some portion of it will not be
used at equilibrium. Moreover, since we characterise the competitive equilibria as global
minimisers of aggregate costs, and agents have negligible market power, the addition of
more storage capacity is profitable if and only if the total amount of storage is less than this
maximal value. This key result leads us to predict that for a given aggregate load profile,
either not all consumers will need to buy storage or the optimal battery capacity to buy
for each consumer will be bounded. In particular, this bound is further supported by our
empirical evaluation of the UK electricity market where only a subsection of the population
is required to adopt storage to minimise their costs (see Section 6).
4.3 Idealised Scenarios
Having determined the existence and characterisation of charging and discharging price
points, we now investigate how these prices will be set in the context of two idealised
scenarios where micro-storage devices have been deployed in the grid on a large scale. This
aims to identify the properties of the system as different parameters tend to particular
limits (and understand the broad system behaviour). Our intuitions on their impact are
expressed through the following corollaries. We consider the situation where agents can sell
electricity back to the grid in order to simplify the results we obtain and thus make clearer
the intuition we are trying to provide. Similar results would hold in the case where agents
cannot sell, but have similar-shaped load profiles, and storage capacities in proportion to
their daily load.
Corollary 1. If agents are allowed to sell electricity back to the grid at the current price,
and if, for all agents a ∈ A, Ca and Da are sufficiently large, then for all i, p+ ≤ pi ≤ p−.
Furthermore, if for any i ∈ I, p+ < pi < p−, then bi = 0.
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Proof. If, for all a ∈ A we let Ca and Da be equal to κa, then this does not break our
smallness assumption, and, furthermore, for all i ∈ I, we’ll have Ψi(p−) < Oi and Φi(p+) <
C. For all i, either bi < 0, in which case 0 < Ψi(p−) < D and so pi = p−, or else bi > 0,
in which case 0 < Φi(p+) < C and so pi = p+, or, lastly, we could have bi = 0, which can
only occur if Φi(p+) = Ψi(p−), and so either p+ = pi = p− or Φi(p+) = Ψi(p−) = 0 and
p+ < pi < p−. This covers all possible cases, as required.
Thus, if the charge and discharge rates are sufficiently high, then we could expect prices
to always lie within p+ and p−.
Corollary 2. If agents are allowed to sell electricity back to the grid at the current price,
and if, for all agents a, Ca and Da are sufficiently large, capacity κ is sufficiently high,
µ = 0 and η = 1, then for all i, p+ = pi = p−.
Proof. If κ is sufficiently high, then we must have an equilibrium where p+ = ηp− − µ, or
p+ = p−. The result then follows directly from the previous corollary.
Hence, in the above scenario, with perfectly efficient, cost free, and high capacity storage,
we would expect the market prices over time to flatten to a single value. This is because
perfect storage capability would allow agents to transport energy from any time interval to
any other time interval free of charge. Thus, different suppliers in different time intervals
would have to compete with each other, resulting in convergence to a single market price.
Even if storage devices are not perfectly efficient, they still have a price flattening effect,
though this is mitigated by the fact that agents would have to buy more energy than they
discharge, meaning they would always require some price difference between charging and
discharging periods. Since prices are a direct function of demand, we can infer that having
large amounts of storage should effectively bound the maximum and minimum levels of
demand for each time period. Thus, we should expect the addition of large amounts of
storage to have a significant effect on the grid load factor, with the size of this effect
directly related to the efficiency of the storage device. Hence, in Section 6, we study the
impact of storage adoption on the grid (i.e., in terms of grid efficiency and cost savings
for the population) and determine the impact of micro-storage devices for various levels
of saturation of micro-storage across the population. Before doing so, however, in the
next section, we provide an analysis of the proportion of the population expected to adopt
storage devices (i.e., based on an individual’s profits from micro-storage). This is important
because, having shown that the real-time price of electricity should flatten, we aim to show
how such prices will impact on the profitability of buying micro-storage. Such an analysis
can then be helpful in determining the viability of micro-storage deployment projects.
4.4 Storage Adoption
Our model shows that as available storage capacity and charging (and discharging) rates
increase, there can be a significant effect on prices. Moreover, it shows there is a limit on
how much storage capacity is required, such that it is profitable to increase capacity if and
only if the available storage is below this limit. Finding such limits is a useful application
of this analysis, as it gives an indication of what level of adoption is likely to occur given
the cost, efficiency and charging and discharging rates of the leading storage technology.
786
Theoretical and Practical Foundations of Agent-Based Micro-Storage
In reality, however, it is not practical for home users to incrementally increase their
storage capacity over time to find the optimal level. The more likely scenario is that when
a home user buys a storage device, they will buy enough to cover their usage requirements.
Aggregate storage capacity will increase over time as more and more homes install such
devices. Predicting the number of potential buyers of micro-storage devices will be key to
understanding (for market makers and producers) whether demand will be large enough
to take advantage of the economies of scale for the production of micro-storage devices (of
high efficiency or high capacity). In this respect, it is crucial to study the maximal level
of storage adoption for such batteries. That is, the percentage of homes that can install
electricity storage devices before it is no longer profitable for more devices to be installed.
We will consider the case where home users cannot sell electricity back to the grid (or
to neighbours). If users can sell stored electricity, then it would be possible that some
users could purchase extra capacity or multiple storage devices as a way to make money.
However, the devices themselves are likely to be manufactured with the energy needs of a
single home in mind, and so this analysis still gives a useful guide to how many such devices
can be profitably deployed throughout the populace.
Corollary 3. Suppose we model a population of agents A such that a subset of agents
A′ ⊂ A have homogeneous storage devices, where |A′| = ρ|A|, for some ρ < 1. Suppose
further that the population of agents in A′ is homogeneous, so that the aggregate load profile
of agents in A′ is ρ!i and that storage devices have sufficiently large maximal charging
and discharging rates and capacities so that they do not restrict their storage profiles at
equilibrium. Then, at equilibrium, it is individually profitable and increases aggregate benefit
for an agent in A \ A′ to install a storage device if and only if:
ρ < max
i∈I
1
!i
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−
,
where p is the maximal solution to:∑
i∈I
(
s−1(ηp− µ)− !i
)+
=
∑
i∈I
min
(
!i,
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−)
.
Proof. We can model this scenario by setting:
Da = Ca = max
i∈I
!ai ,
and
κa =
∑
i∈I
!ai ,
for all a ∈ A′ and Ca = Ca = κa = 0 for all a ∈ A \ A′. For the agents in A′, these values
for maximal charging and discharging rates and capacities are sufficiently large that the
corresponding constraints cannot be tight at equilibrium.
From Theorem 1, the aggregate storage profile at equilibrium will be:(
s−1(ηp− − µ)− !i
)+−min(ρ!i, (s−1(p−)− !i)−)
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where p− is the maximal solution to:∑
i∈I
(
s−1(ηp− − µ)− !i
)+
=
∑
i∈I
min
(
ρ!i,
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−)
. (4)
It is profitable for an agent in A \ A′ to get a storage device if and only if the addition
of that storage device will increase the total amount of energy charged and discharged at
equilibrium. For if the addition of the storage device does lead to an increase in the total
amount of energy charged, it means that it is more profitable for the agent to use its storage
device than not to use it. Thus, the agent must obtain some profit by having the device.
If the addition of the storage device would not lead to an increase in the total amount of
energy charged, then, since the amount charged is:∑
i∈I
min
(
ρ!i,
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−)
,
This means the addition of the storage device can have no effect on p−. Hence, in this
circumstance, the addition of a storage device would have no effect on the aggregate storage
profile, and so the collection of storage profiles that agents have in equilibrium would still
remain an equilibrium if a new device was added – with the maximally profitable behaviour
of the agent with the new device being to simply not use it.
If for any i ∈ I,
ρ!i <
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−
,
then, since the addition of a storage device will strictly increase ρ, the previous value of p−
will no longer satisfy (4) and so p−, along with the total amount of energy charged, will
increase. Otherwise, increasing ρ has no effect on (4), meaning p− will not change, and
neither will the aggregate amount of energy charged.
Let p be the maximal solution to:∑
i∈I
(
s−1(ηp− µ)− !i
)+
=
∑
i∈I
min
(
!i,
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−)
.
If
ρ!i <
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−
for some i ∈ I then, since, by inspection p ≥ p−, we must have:
ρ!i <
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−
.
If
ρ!i ≥
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−
for all i, then p− satisfies:∑
i∈I
(
s−1(ηp− − µ)− !i
)+
=
∑
i∈I
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−
,
and, since !i > ρ!i, p− satisfies:∑
i∈I
(
s−1(ηp− − µ)− !i
)+
=
∑
i∈I
min
(
!i,
(
s−1(p−)− !i
)−)
,
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and so, p− = p and:
ρ!i ≥
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−
.
Thus, the condition for an additional storage device to be profitable is that for some
i ∈ I,
ρ!i <
(
s−1(p)− !i
)−
as required.
This corollary can be used to give an indication of the level of adoption in a population
required to see maximal aggregate cost savings from the use of energy storage. Later, in
Sections 6.6 and 7, we complement this result with an empirical study of the system-wide
benefits of micro-storage adoption in the UK market (where agents use our novel storage
strategies) which points to a similar bound on the level of storage adoption.
4.5 Rationality Assumption
So far, our main results (i.e., Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1, 2, and 3) give the aggregate
storage behaviour when our game is in a deterministic competitive equilibrium and predict
the extent and nature of the adoption of storage devices in a population. We can use these
results to specify the limits of the grid performance benefits and market conditions (i.e.,
levels of adoption and equilibrium price for electricity) that can result from adopting micro-
storage. If the actions of such selfish and profit-motivated agents are to result in stable
aggregate behaviour, then we can do no better than the outcomes described above.
However, in using game theory, we have made some implicit assumptions, specifically
that agents are rational and have complete information about the market throughout the
time period and have the ability to compute an optimal strategy given that information.
In reality, information available to those owning storage devices will not be perfect and
the agents will have different computational capabilities. Furthermore, even with perfect
information, it might not be apparent to an automated agent which strategies are preferable.
Instead, the agents themselves must adapt over time, to become aware of any changes in
market prices, and learn which storage strategies are preferable. This is a difficult problem
and it is not guaranteed that selfish learning behaviour can converge. In particular, if agents
over-react to perceived opportunities in the market, cycles of price fluctuations could develop
with no stable outcome (as seen in Subsection 6.2).
Having looked at an analytical approach which required complete information, in the
next section, we provide a practical and (informationally) decentralised approach that ad-
dresses this lack of complete information. Specifically, we describe a novel adaptive storage
strategy that dynamically adapts to changes in market prices, allowing the selfish, profit-
motivated agents to individually maximise their savings using only their private information
and information about observed market prices. Under this scheme, agents learn to change
their storage profiles each day to be closer to their perceived optimal strategy. In Section 6,
we show that provided the adaptation is not too fast, our mechanism converges to an equi-
librium predicted by Theorem 1. Moreover, our empirical results confirm the bounds on
storage capacity and adoption of storage we have predicted so far. Altogether, these re-
sults show that the assumptions we have made in our theoretical framework are reasonable
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enough to model heterogeneous populations of agents and, therefore, our framework can be
generally applied to large-scale micro-storage analysis.
5. An Adaptive Storage Strategy
In this section, we present a novel adaptive strategy that an agent can use to decide when
to store energy and when to use the energy it has stored. Now, for the system to converge
towards an equilibrium, we need to avoid having too many agents charging their batteries
at the same time, in turn resulting in higher costs for everyone. Any strategy that achieves
this would be a good candidate as long as it is shown to converge to the equilibrium. One
possible candidate would allow the agents to adapt their storage profile solely using a target
profile (which would be the equilibrium profile in this case) provided by the supplier (similar
to existing TOU pricing schemes which, rather poorly, incentivise charging during off-peak
hours and discharging at peak time). However, such a strategy would require optimisation
by a centre (i.e., the supplier) and the solution would depend on how accurately the supplier
can estimate the combined charging and discharging rate limits and storage capacities of
all agents with storage devices across the grid and how often it needs to do so. Thus, we
prefer a strategy that does not require grid-wide knowledge and that can adapt based only
on the agents’ private information (i.e., information about their own micro-storage devices)
and the observed market information (i.e., real-time retail prices that continuously change
as a result of changing demand due to consumers using storage devices). Indeed, we design
such a decentralised strategy which we now describe in more detail.
Our strategy is based on a day-ahead best-response storage.10 Because the market
prices are unknown a priori, we can only calculate the storage profile on a day-ahead basis,
as a best-response to the predicted market prices (which are only observed a posteriori
once the aggregate demand of the market is known). Now, if all agents were to adopt
their best-response, the resulting effect would simply be peaks moving from periods of high
demand to those with previously low demand as we empirically demonstrate in Subsection
6.2. With the peaks in demand moved to previously low-demand periods (as are peaks
in market prices), the agents end up paying higher prices when they charge their battery.
Thus, an agent that plays its best-response is exposed to these changing peaks. To mitigate
its exposure to these changes, we need to ensure that each agent gradually adapts its storage
towards the best-response storage instead of reacting to prices and, by so doing, avoid all
agents herding to consume at the lowest predicted price point. In this section, we first
describe how we calculate the day-ahead best response storage profile and, second, we
describe our learning mechanism, that is how the agent adapts its storage.
10. Our strategy is unaffected by the use of different time-scales (other than day-ahead). We perform the
day-ahead optimisation in our case as there exists a natural cycle of consumption over similar days that
we can exploit to generate load profile distributions in our simulations and reduce the number of times
the optimisation algorithms have to be run. In a real-world deployment, a finer grained optimisation (at
the level of half or quarter hours) would probably be more appropriate as the agent re-optimises based
on the up-to-date intra-day half-hourly consumption and market prices as well as the current amount of
stored energy available.
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5.1 The Day-Ahead Best-Response Storage
The objective of agent a is to minimise its costs by storing energy when prices are low and
using that energy when prices are high. Now, because market prices are unknown until
the aggregated load of all consumers
∑
a∈A !
a
i = !i is known, the agent needs to decide
on its storage profiles based on a prediction of the market prices. Note that in our work,
we assume that market prices do not move significantly over similar days (e.g., during the
same season, weekdays tend to be similar to each other but different to week ends) and use
a weighted moving average to predict these future market prices.11
We compute the storage profile, bai = c
a
i − dai at every time-slot during the day as the
solution to the optimisation problem (expressed as a linear program) where we minimise the
following cost function given the decision variables cai , d
a
i , and κ˜
a (representing the storage
capacity):12
argmin
ba
(∑
i∈I
pi(c
a
i − dai + !ai ) + µacai
)
(5)
subject to the following constraints:
Constraint 1: Energy conservation∑
i∈I
dai = η
a
∑
i∈I
cai
Constraint 2: Within charging and discharging rate limits
dai ≤ Da and cai ≤ Ca ∀i ∈ I
Constraint 3: Energy that can be stored or used at a time-slot
dai ≤ ηa
(
ca0 +
∑i−1
j=1
(
caj − daj
))
∀i ∈ I
cai ≤ κ˜a −
(
ca0 +
∑i−1
j=1
(
caj − daj
))
∀i ∈ I
Constraint 4: No reselling allowed
!ai − dai ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
The last constraint can be removed in a system where consumers are allowed to sell power
to the grid. Note that when the capacity of the storage κa is known, κ˜a is constrained
to κa and when we need to find κa, κ˜a is left unconstrained in the optimisation and κa
is then calculated as the maximum energy stored (in the optimised storage profile), i.e.,
maxi∈I
(
ca0 +
∑i
j=1 b
a
j
)
.
11. As we will demonstrate later on, this is not central to our work as the price movements are generally
small. However, a number of more sophisticated prediction algorithms, such as regression or Gaussian
processes, could be used instead for better predictions if price movements were significant as a result of
a very volatile market.
12. We used IBM ILOG CPLEX 12 to implement and solve the linear program.
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As described earlier, µa is the cost of using storage which we set to be very small as
we wish to find the best response regardless of the external factor which is the cost of
storage. ηa is the efficiency of the storage device, Ca is the maximum charging rate, Da the
maximum discharging rate and ca0 is the amount of energy stored at the beginning of the
day which is equal to the stored energy at the end of the day. We next consider how the
agent adapts its storage based on its best-response.
5.2 Learning in the Market
Because market prices move each day, the agent needs to continuously adapt its storage
profile to reflect these changes. One may expect that if micro-storage is incrementally rolled
out, the agents would be able to gradually adapt and stabilise market prices. However, as
we will empirically demonstrate in Subsection 6.2, the system becomes unstable when too
many agents attempt to optimise at the same time, even if they use their best response and
incrementally acquire micro-storage devices. Now, because of the relatively high cost of
storage (compared to the savings in energy cost — see Section 7) and assuming the effect of
micro-storage in the system will change market prices significantly (such that the optimal
capacity the agent requires will be changing — as predicted by the results in Section 4.2),
it is necessary for the agent to gradually change how much of its absolute storage capacity
that it actually uses. To this end, based on intuitions drawn from our analytical results that
point to a bound on the capacity required and the adaptation of charging profiles to prices
at different times of the day, we develop a learning mechanism based on the Widrow-Hoff
learning rule (i.e., a gradient descent approach)13 that adapts both the storage profile and
capacity of the micro-storage device that is used with respect to changes in the market
prices.
Our learning mechanism is based on a two-pass approach to adapt the storage capacity
and profile. Initially, the agent computes the optimal storage capacity κa required to
minimise its costs. More precisely, κa is the cost-minimising capacity by setting κ˜a as an
unconstrained variable in the optimisation (see Equation (5)). Now, κa constitutes a desired
capacity towards which the agent adapts its utilised storage capacity. That is, it changes
its storage capacity that it uses progressively to follow the changing trend of market prices.
The actual storage capacity used by the agent is defined by Equation (6) as κa(t) that
follows the desired storage capacity κa such that:
κa(t+ 1) = κa(t) + γ1(κa − κa(t)) (6)
where κa(0) = 0 by default and γ1 is the learning rate of the storage capacity of agent
a.14 Given its storage capacity, the agent then computes its optimal storage profile for the
following day by fixing κa at κa(t+ 1) in Equation (5).
On the second pass, given its current storage profile, the agent adapts its storage profile
as follows:
13. We used the Widrow-Hoff rule as it can be directly engineered into our optimisation algorithm, but with
relatively minor changes, other learning rules (such as reinforcement learning or Bayesian learning) could
be used.
14. As we will empirically demonstrate in Section 6, the choice of the learning rates determines the evolu-
tionary stability of the system and has to be reasonably small to ensure convergence.
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bai (t+ 1) = b
a
i (t) + γ2(β
a
i − bai (t)) ∀i ∈ I (7)
where βa is the desired storage profile given as the optimal storage profile subject to a fixed
storage capacity of κa(t + 1) and γ2 ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate of the strategy. Note that
we analyse in more detail the sensitivity of the learning parameters γ1 and γ2 as part of the
empirical study of the system in the next section.
6. An Empirical Analysis of Micro-Storage in the UK Market
Based on the adaptive storage strategies defined in the previous section, the analysis of
micro-storage we present in this section aims to complement the theoretical part of this
paper which assumed a largely homogeneous population of agents (see Section 4). In par-
ticular, here we evaluate the emergent properties of a large populations of 1000 agents15
owning micro-storage of different charging and discharging rates and sizes and using our
learning strategy to adapt their storage profile during 500 simulation days over 200 runs.
At the beginning of each simulation day, an agent makes a prediction of its load profile
and the market prices (using historical data) across the 48 time-slots to compute its best
response on a day-ahead basis. At the end of the simulation day, the actual market prices
are computed from the total domestic market demand (i.e., the aggregate load and storage
profiles) based on the market macro-model described in Subsection 3.2 and published to all
the agents a posteriori. To frame our results within a real-world context, our simulations
focus on the UK electricity grid.16
Thus, given our macro-model of the UK electricity retail market (see Section 3.2), we
initialise individual consumers with typical UK load profiles.17 Moreover, the learning rates
of the agents (presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2), as well as their charging and discharging
rates, are normally distributed around means drawn from charging (and discharging) rates of
current technologies (see Section 2).18 This is done to represent heterogeneous consumers
with different types of storage devices and address a more realistic scenario than in our
game-theoretic analysis.
Given this setup, for benchmarking purposes we first compute the competitive equi-
librium predicted by our game-theoretic framework (which assumes complete information
15. This simulation could be readily extended to hundreds of thousands of agents given the distributed
nature of the computation. Now, given that, on average, agents tend to have similar load profiles, we
assume here that there are 1000 different clusters of load profiles among the domestic consumers such
that a simulation with only 1000 agents (rather than millions) is valid. We have observed from real data
that such an assumption about the heterogeneity of the UK domestic population is reasonable.
16. Note that we choose UK as a typical deregulated market. Our approach is nonetheless general enough
that our framework can be applied for other markets, including industrial or commercial markets (as
opposed to the residential case we consider) as well as micro-grids or the national grid of other countries
based on a macro-model of their electricity market. Thus, the results and insights presented in this paper
broadly generalise.
17. The profile of an agent is based on a normal distribution with mean !mean which is taken as the UK
average profile. It is formally defined as !ai ∼ N(!meani ,σ), !ai ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I where σ = 0.2 to approximate
the typical spiky daily profiles of consumers.
18. In all experiments except for when we analyse the effect of learning rates, we draw values for the learning
rates from a normal distribution N(0.05, 0.02). Through experimentation, this was found to result in
good system-wide performance (see Section 6.5) and is not too small that the system is slow to converge.
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about all agents’ load profiles and battery capacities) for the UK electricity grid. Second,
we study how the system breaks down (in terms of the average individual costs and grid
performance metrics defined in Section 3.3) if agents were to gradually adopt storage with
no adaptive mechanism. This comparison motivates the need for our adaptive mechanism,
and, against these results, we empirically demonstrate that the market does indeed converge
to the competitive equilibrium when the population of agents adopt our adaptive storage
mechanism. Third, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the convergence properties of our
adaptive mechanism with respect to the learning rates to understand the impact of different
learning rates on cost savings and grid performance and how these parameters should be
set. Fourth, we evaluate the robustness of our approach when agents with micro-storage
do not adopt our learning mechanism. Finally, we evaluate the impact of different degrees
of saturation of micro-storage (using our agent-based micro-storage management) on the
efficiency of the grid and, in so doing, study the performance of the grid (see Subsection
3.3) as more and more consumers adopt the technology.
6.1 The Game-Theoretic Solution
Given the game-theoretic framework outlined in Section 4, we first calculate the competitive
equilibrium based on the average domestic consumption profile of a consumer (from the UK)
using the procedure described in Subsection 4.2 (i.e., where devices are perfectly efficient
and costless). The resulting storage profile is shown in Figure 4. It is clear that the
equilibrium behaviour for a consumer is to charge at off-peak hours (at night) and use the
stored energy during peak hours (after working hours) when the consumers’ load is highest.
Furthermore, as observed in Figure 4, at the equilibrium, the optimised load profile (i.e., the
sum of the aggregate unoptimised load profile and storage profile) is flattened completely
with a load factor of 1. This implies that agent-based micro-storage management can
theoretically reduce peaks completely and be completely efficient. Furthermore, the storage
capacity required to achieve this equilibrium is 2.3 kWh, computed as the maximum of the
cumulative sum of the storage profile (as the micro-storage device charges and discharges
over each time-slot). In the next subsection, we first demonstrate how, in practice, the
system breaks down completely without an adaptive mechanism to motivate our need for
an adaptive mechanism and, we then go on to show that the system indeed converges to
the competitive equilibrium when our decentralised adaptive mechanism is adopted.
6.2 Market without the Adaptive Mechanism
To analyse how the market operates without the adaptive mechanism, we set up a population
of agents playing their best-response storage profile every day (i.e., using the optimisation
algorithm defined in Section 5.1). Moreover, we simulate the gradual adoption of storage
devices by the consumers, with a rate of adoption, r (i.e., a probability of r that an agent
will adopt storage and keep a storage device; r = 1 simulates a system where all agents
have storage capabilities at the beginning). Once an agent has storage capability, it will
optimise daily and use its best-response storage profile. For this setting, Figure 5(a) shows
the deviation from the competitive equilibrium while Figure 5(b) shows the load factor of
the grid for different values of r. When r = 1 (i.e., all consumers adopt micro-storage
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Figure 4: Storage profile and load profile at the competitive equilibrium.
devices at the same time), the system clearly deviates from the equilibrium with the load
factor jumping immediately from 0.66 (without micro-storage) to 0.4 (with the immediate
adoption of microstorage), suggesting larger peaks in the system. For smaller values of r,
the system converges at the beginning (as the demand slowly decreases at peak time and
increases at off-peak time since only a small proportion of agents can change their demand),
only to break down after a number of simulation days and ends up with larger peaks. The
smaller r is, the longer the system takes to break down, though it inevitably does so. The
intuition behind this is that there invariably reaches a point when there are too many agents
that have adopted micro-storage devices and are using their best-response storage profile.
With too many agents re-optimising their storage profiles at the same time, the peaks
in market demand are moved around such that aggregate demand profile is not flattened
(inferred from the non-increasing load factor on a long-term). In the next subsection, we
show that our adaptive strategy helps remedy this and results in desirable system-wide
performance.
6.3 Market with the Adaptive Mechanism
Here, we study the convergence properties of our adaptive mechanism and also show how the
results corroborate the theoretical bound on storage capacity suggested in Section 4 (given
the worst case scenario in Subsection 6.2 when r = 1). In more detail, given a population
of agents using the adaptive mechanism with γ1 ∼ N(0.05, 0.02) and γ2 ∼ N(0.05, 0.02)
(we show how the performance varies with different learning rates in the next section), the
average storage profile is found to converge rapidly to the competitive equilibrium of our
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(a) Deviation of the population without adaptive storage from competitive equi-
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Figure 5: Convergence properties of a system with no adaptive storage.
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game-theoretic analysis within less than 20 simulation days (see Figure 6).19 As expected,
the convergence results from the agents gradually adapting their storage profiles such that
the aggregate market demand is shifted from peak to off-peak.
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Figure 6: Convergence of the average storage profile to the competitive equilibrium when
all agents adopt the adaptive mechanism.
As the system converges to the competitive equilibrium, we also observe how the grid
efficiency (as measured by the LF and DF) improves and gradually converges (see Figure
7) as agents adapt their storage profiles and the system converges to the competitive equi-
librium. In more detail, from Figure 7, we observe that the system LF increases from 0.68
and converges to around 0.93, suggesting considerably fewer peaks in the grid when micro-
storage is adopted, and indeed, a flattened demand.20 This is coupled with a DF that is
close to 1 which indicates (as discussed in Section 3.3) that, even though agents have closely
correlated load profiles, overall, these profiles tend to be reasonably flat.
Furthermore, from Figure 8, we can see that the average storage capacity required
converges to around 2.3 kWh (which equals the storage capacity prescribed by our analytical
solution — see Section 6.1) after several simulation days. This implies that while the average
19. Given that weekdays are homogeneous (as opposed to Saturdays and Sundays), the agent can learn
across weekdays such that the system would converge within a couple of weeks.
20. The results for each simulation day were averaged over the number of simulations. Furthermore, a
simulation size of 200 was statistically significant, with results in the figures given with error bars at the
95% confidence interval.
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Figure 7: Efficiency of the grid as system converges to competitive equilibrium when all
agents adopt the adaptive mechanism.
consumer may buy a storage device of capacity 3kWh (see the maximum storage capacity
in Figure 8), the agent would actually only need 2.3kWh of this capacity to minimise costs.
6.4 Sensitivity of the Adaptive Mechanism
One of the assumptions of our approach is that agents are expected to adopt the adaptive
mechanism. While this can be imposed as a feature of the smart meter controlling the
micro-storage device, it can exceptionally be the case that the smart meter is tampered
with or that the user programs it to ignore the learning mechanism and only use its best
response, i.e., the agent always executes its optimal behaviour. Thus, in this subsection,
we study the effect on the system if part of the population were not to adopt our proposed
adaptive mechanism, assuming that the whole population has storage capability.
From Figure 9, we can observe that the system is particularly robust and only starts
degrading when more than 60% of the population do not adopt the adaptive mechanism
and deliberately execute their best response. As the proportion of the population playing
their best response increases, the load factor slightly increases to 0.94 until the proportion
of population reaches around 60% after which the load factor rapidly decreases to 0.4
(suggesting large peaks in the system) when all agents adopt their best response, i.e., there
is no adaptive behaviour in the system. While some agents are using their best response,
other agents are gradually adapting their storage profiles (implicitly adapting to the impact
of the former agents’ best-response profile). The system eventually breaks down when too
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the competitive equilibrium.
many agents are using their best response and too few their adaptive mechanism. We also
notice a small increase in load factor as a result of the increased diversity among agents, an
emergent behaviour which we again observe when analysing the load factor of a population
with different proportions having storage capability (see Subsection 6.6 for a discussion).
Note that while the system remains robust upto 60% population saturation of micro-storage
even without a learning mechanism, our mechanism ensures that the system does not break
down for any proportion of the population, as we observe in Subsection 6.6.
6.5 Sensitivity of the Convergence Properties
To guarantee the consistency of our results given different parameter settings, in this section
we explore how the values of the learning rates21 γ1 and γ2 affect our convergence results.22
In so doing, we aim to determine how fast an agent should ideally adapt its storage profile
to maximise its savings while, if possible, helping to improve the efficiency of the grid.
Figure 10(a) shows that the smaller the learning rate, the more efficient the system (with
a higher load factor). The intuition behind this is that a small learning rate allows the
market prices to change gradually. A higher learning rate, on the other hand, would result
21. Because the learning rates are intrinsic to the adaptive mechanism, we assume that γ1 and γ2 share the
same value without loss of generality as we are interested in how fast our mechanism adapts rather than
specifically in the two-part adaptation.
22. The mean load factors and savings between Day 400 and Day 500 (by which time the system generally
has converged) were recorded and averaged over 200 runs for different learning rates.
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in agents adopting their optimal storage profile too quickly rather than gradually, which
clearly results in poor savings and poor system efficiency with peaks cycling in the system.
As the learning rate increases, the load factor quickly decreases to 0.59 when all agents
adopt their best-response immediately. From an individual perspective, the agent would
typically set its learning parameter based on its savings. From Figure 10(b), we can see
that, likewise, the smaller the learning parameter is, the better the average savings23 of the
individual agent.
Now, because an infinitely small learning rate is infeasible as it implies an infinitely
long time to reach the equilibrium, a trade-off is required. Specifically, because the learning
parameters are not very sensitive when they are small, a value of 0.05 is reasonable given
that the decrease in savings would be negligible. As mentioned in Footnote 18, we use this
value for all our experiments.
Given these results, we can claim that our adaptive strategy sets the benchmark for
any learning strategy in this system (i.e., the base requirement for any such strategy would
be convergence). While these results mainly hold for a whole population owning storage,
it is important to see how the system performs as storage is gradually introduced in the
population. This should enable us to identify the optimal level of adoption of storage that
is required in order to maximise grid efficiency. In so doing, we also aim to complement our
analytical results (see Section 4.4) with empirical evidence showing the level of adoption
that is still profitable for individual users to acquire storage in the UK market.
23. The average saving of a consumer is computed as the difference in her average costs (after the system
has converged) in a system with micro-storage (i.e., after the system has converged) and in one without.
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6.6 Grid Efficiency with Incremental Micro-Storage Adoption
In the following set of experiments, we investigate the grid performance metrics and carbon
emission reductions (which is one of the main aims of this work) achieved by our mechanism
as micro-storage is incrementally adopted.24 From Figure 11, we can observe that the grid
efficiency peaks at only 32% of the population (rather than at the aggregate storage capacity
of the population at 100%). This suggests that only 32% of the population is required to
have storage to maximise the grid efficiency. As that proportion increases from 0, more
agents have storage capability and thus storage profiles that are being adapted to flatten
the demand. Their aggregate storage profile gradually flattens the aggregate load profile
such that the load factor increases as does the diversity factor (since more agents now have
a storage profile and, thus, an adapted demand profile). Eventually, the load factor peaks
at 32%, at which point, the system is flattened as much as it could be. As more agents
acquire storage devices, the diversity factor decreases to 1 as more agents use storage, and
finally settles at 1, where, on average, they have the same (flatter) load profile and storage
profile. Furthermore, with more agents optimising at the same time, the load factor also
decreases slightly as too many agents are now trying to optimise and adapt their storage
profiles at the same time. Specifically, agents are optimising a surplus of storage capacity
that is not required to flatten the demand of the grid. As can be seen, the diversity factor
decreases which suggests that optimising the surplus of storage increases correlation among
individual demand profiles. The increased correlation further suggests that any small peak
in the load profiles has more impact which, on average, decreases the load factor.
From Figure 12, we also observe that a significant benefit of storage at a macro-level (i.e.,
ignoring the individual benefits of the agents – which we study in the next section) is that
if a sufficient proportion (32%) of the population does adopt storage, the carbon emissions
of the electricity market would decrease appreciably as peak demands are reduced. Indeed,
the carbon emission in the UK can be reduced by up to 7% (from 63 to 58.3 kilotonnes
CO2 per day),25 reaching a minimum when the domestic load factor is maximised (since
reducing the peaks in demand has the effect of reducing the carbon intensity of the supplied
electricity, which in turn, reduces the total carbon emissions).
7. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Micro-Storage
So far, we have studied the efficiency of the grid achieved by the population as storage is
gradually adopted. We now turn to the individual consumer who is principally driven by
how much profit she can achieve by adopting micro-storage (at a certain cost). In particular,
24. Note that the results we describe here (i.e., the grid efficiency after the system converges) are similar to
our game-theoretic solution given that a system where only a proportion of the population has storage
translates to a model in which there are smaller aggregate charging and discharging limits — see Section
4.
25. We calculate the carbon emissions by considering the reduction in carbon intensity of the electricity
supply when the domestic load factor reduces (see Figure 3). We consider a total population of 26M UK
households and scale these results to take account of the fact that these domestic consumers represent
30% of the total UK demand (as discussed in Section 3) and the remaining 70% consisting of commercial
and industrial profiles that remain unchanged.
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Figure 11: Grid efficiency (i.e., the load factor and the diversity factor) for different pro-
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the question we wish to address is that: at what level of adoption is storage still profitable
to agents in the system?26 Hence, in our experiments, we first assume no cost of storage
and only vary the proportion of the population with storage and record the cost-savings
achieved by the parts of the population that have and have not adopted micro-storage. From
our results (see Figure 13), we first observe that when very few agents have micro-storage
(i.e, close to 0%), the potential average savings to each agent is close to 14%. As more
consumers adopt storage, the average saving gradually decreases to slightly less than 8%
(as market prices also flatten and agents can no longer benefit from the difference between
low off-peak prices and high peak prices). Interestingly, we also observe that consumers
without micro-storage also benefit from its use by other consumers. This is because, as
empirically demonstrated in Section 6, the adoption of micro-storage flattens the peaks
in demand in the system and, thus, market prices. This means cheaper electricity for the
domestic market and, indeed, as more and more consumers adopt micro-storage, the savings
of those consumers that do not adopt it, also increase. There reaches a point when 48% of
consumers adopt micro-storage and the savings for those consumers with and without the
technology are equal. As the percentage increases past 48%, the savings for those consumers
who do not adopt micro-storage exceed those of the consumers who do adopt it. This is
because the consumers with micro-storage are trying to optimise a surplus of storage as
argued in Section 6.6. The implication of this dynamic is that consumers are incentivised
to adopt micro-storage until the 48% mark is reached. At this point, there is no incentive
for the consumers to deviate from their chosen behaviour (i.e., use micro-storage or not).27
Thus, over a long term, the system will converge to an equilibrium where only 48% of
the population adopt micro-storage and at that percentage, consumers can expect a saving
of 9% on their individual electricity bills (which equates to an annual saving of £60 per
household – based on an average annual electricity bill of £675). This result also points
to a slight misalignment between the optimal level of storage for the grid (in terms of grid
efficiency) and that for the consumers (in terms of savings). In particular, given the results
in the previous section (see Figure 11), we note that the 48% level of adoption equates to a
domestic load factor of 0.91, while the maximum load factor achievable (assuming control
over the proportion of population adoption storage) is 0.94 which occurs at 32% adoption.
This suggests that at the proportion of adoption that the system eventually settle at, the
system is only slightly suboptimal.
We next consider this dynamic within a more realistic setting when there is a cost to
storage, typically a startup cost from hardware installation (e.g., wiring and converter) and
the cost of the actual battery. Based on how much storage capacity the average consumer
would require to maximise her savings for different proportions of the population, we cal-
culate the savings minus the cost of storage (based on a typical battery costing £200 per
kWh and £600 per kWh respectively with a lifetime of 10 years and a fixed startup cost
of £200 for both) and assuming an average cost of electricity of £675 for a consumer per
26. Note that, with respect to an average consumer’s savings, this set of experiments complement those in
Section 6.5 where we studied the cost-savings of the users as the learning rate is varied.
27. Note that the consumer is aware of its savings with and without micro-storage which can be computed
based on its initial load profile and the demand profile with the storage profile.
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Figure 13: Savings without storage and with storage (for the different costs of storage).
year.28 Note that savings without storage do not change as they are independent of the
cost of micro-storage. Given this setup, our results (see Figure 13) show that there is a
clear first-mover advantage. Thus, a maximum saving can be achieved when the propor-
tion of the population with micro-storage is close to zero (i.e., only a few agents in the
population own storage). However, the storage capacity these agents require is relatively
high at 4.5kWh, decreasing rapidly to 2.3kWh when all consumers in the population adopt
micro-storage (see Figure 14). Moreover, based on the savings with cost of storage and the
savings without storage, we observe that the equilibrium moves to 23% for a cost of storage
device of £200 per kWh and to 10% for a cost of £600 per kWh (given a startup cost of
£200). Hence, by combining the latter results with those from Figure 11, we can infer that
the grid efficiency quickly drops as the cost of storage increases (as the level of adoption
decreases). Thus, the cost of storage can significantly affect the benefits derived by the
users and by the grid as a whole.
The above results, however, consider populations of agents drawn uniformly from the
UK average load profile. It could therefore be argued that such results may not apply in
circumstances where the population is not uniformly distributed and, in particular, if users
consume differing amounts of energy — making savings from storage more viable for those
consuming more (as they are able to shift more energy across the day and recover the high
startup cost of such a system) than others consuming less. Given this, we next expand our
28. We compare the cost of storage with the daily cost of electricity by calculating the daily cost of owning
and running a storage device, i.e., the cost of the storage device and the startup costs that we assume,
are spread over the lifetime of the storage device which, in this case, is 10 years. A battery costing
£200 per kWh and £600 per kWh, both with a startup costs of £200 equals 1p and 3p per kWh per
day respectively, while, on average, the daily cost of electricity is 180p for an 8kWh daily electricity
consumption (see Subsection 2.1).
805
Vytelingum, Voice, Ramchurn, Rogers & Jennings
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
St
or
ag
e 
Ca
pa
cit
y (
kW
h)
Proportion of population with storage
Figure 14: Average storage capacity required for different proportions of the population
with storage.
cost-benefit analysis to consider a fundamental distinction between users, namely the low-
end users (typically with a yearly consumption29 of 1650 kWh) and high-end users (typically
with a yearly consumption of 4950 kWh). In particular, we want to analyse the dynamics of
the proportion of low-end and high-end users that will adopt storage (i.e., given a number
of agents of each type, what proportion of each type will adopt storage). The aim here is
to investigate which type of consumers can benefit the most from our system and, indeed,
whether our system can be more efficient. To this end, we adopt an evolutionary game
theoretic approach that is suitable to analyse such dynamics, and determine whether the
system eventually settles to a stable equilibrium where the behaviours (whether or not to
adopt storage) do not change. We next describe our evolutionary game-theoretic framework
and, thereon, provide a cost-benefit analysis for low-end and high-end users.
7.1 The Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Model
Here, we formulate the problem as a game where all low-end users adopt the same mixed
strategy30 piLUr ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., the probability that the low-end users have storage capability)
and are only motivated by financial gains, while all high-end users adopt a mixed strategy
29. This data is drawn from typical consumption data published by British Gas UK at
www.britishgas.co.uk. Furthermore, we assume that both types of consumers have the same nor-
malised daily average load profiles.
30. We assume that agents of the same type share the same mixed strategy given that, on average, they
have the same load and storage profiles and thus, the same expected savings.
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piHUr ∈ (0, 1). By analysing how piLUr and piHUr evolve as the payoffs change for different
proportions of the population of low-end and high-end users with storage, we want to study
how the proportion of the population using storage evolves. To this end, we use the classical
evolutionary game-theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995) in which we first compute the heuristic
average payoffs of the low-end and high-end (based on simulations) (whether or not using
and not using storage) for different mixed strategies piHUr and pi
LU
r , given respectively by:
uLU (pi
LU ,piHU ) =
∑
r∈S
uLU (r,pi
LU ,piHU )piLUr
uHU (pi
LU ,piHU ) =
∑
r∈S
uHU (r,pi
LU ,piHU )piHUr
where uLU (r,piLU ,piHU ) is the payoff of low-end users adopting the pure strategy r given
the low-end users’ mixed strategy piLU and the high-end users’ mixed strategy piLU and
uHU (r,piLU ,piHU ) the corresponding the payoff for high-end users.
We then use these results to calculate the replicator dynamics, p˙iLU and p˙iHU , that
describe the dynamics of the population (i.e., how the proportions of low-end and high-end
users are evolving), and are given by:
p˙iLUr = [uLU (r,pi
LU ,piHU )− uLU (piLU ,piHU )]piLUr ∀r ∈ S
p˙iHUk = [uHU (k,pi
LU ,piHU )− uHU (piLU ,piHU )]piHUk ∀k ∈ S
Finally, we test whether it converges to any Nash equilibria (piLUnash,pi
HU
nash), points where
there are no incentives for either low-end or high-end consumers to deviate from.
(piLUnash,pi
HU
nash) = arg min
piLU ,piHU
∑
r∈S
(
max[uLU (r,pi
LU ,piHU )− uLU (piLU ,piHU ), 0]
)2
+
∑
k∈S
(
max[uHU (k,pi
LU ,piHU )− uHU (piLU ,piHU ), 0]
)2
In the next subsection we provide the results of our EGT analysis.
7.2 EGT Analysis of Micro-Storage Adoption with Low- and High-end Users
The results of the EGT analysis are given in Figure 15 for different costs of the storage device
(i.e., £0, £200, £400, £500, £1000 per kWh) assuming a typical lifetime of 10 years for a
battery and a startup cost of £200. Thus, we can observe that when storage is completely
subsidised (i.e., cost of storage is 0), we have a range of Nash equilibria (along the straight
line from (piLU = 0.4,piHU = 1.0) to (piLU = 0.7,piHU = 0)). Furthermore, from Figure 16,
we can observe that at these Nash equilibria, the grid efficiency of the system is very high
(the load factor is higher than 0.9).
Now, when startup cost increases to £200 per kWh, we now have a single Nash equi-
librium at (piLUnash = 0.07,pi
HU
nash = 1) with a lower load factor of 0.82 (see Figure 16). This
implies that the system eventually converges to a Nash equilibrium where all high-end con-
sumers adopt storage while only 7% of the low-end users do so. This is because the high-end
users overall make more savings (than low-end users) that cover the daily cost of storage and
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the high startup costs. However, as the cost of the storage device increases to just £200 per
kWh, storage becomes too expensive for all low-end users, with the Nash equilibrium now
at (piLUnash = 0,pi
HU
nash = 1), but is still economically beneficial for all high-end users. With
increasing cost, storage gradually becomes too expensive even for the high-end users, as
seen from the change of the Nash equilibrium (piLUnash,pi
HU
nash) from (0,0.94) to (0,0.55) when
the cost of the storage device is £400 per kWh and to (0,0.37) when the cost of the storage
device is £500 per kWh. Eventually, the cost of the storage device is too high even for the
high-end users at £1000 per kWh, with the Nash equilibrium now at (piLUnash = 0,pi
HU
nash = 0).
By considering the change in the Nash equilibria as the cost of the storage device increases,
we also observe from Figure 16 that the domestic load factor decreases gradually to 0.68
when micro-storage has no impact on the grid, being too expensive to be adopted. From
this analysis, we gather that to improve grid efficiency and to maximise the impact of micro-
storage on the grid, the cost of storage has to be sufficiently small, and subsidising storage
would help improve the efficiency of the grid.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we set out to explore the theoretical and practical foundations of agent-
based micro-storage implementation in the smart grid. To achieve these objectives, we
first developed a game-theoretic framework to analyse the strategic choices that agents
make in using micro-storage devices in the grid. Our framework allows one to predict the
competitive equilibrium of the system, and in particular, specify theoretical bounds on the
level of micro-storage adoption and the capacity of micro-storage that will be adopted by a
largely homogeneous population.
Building upon the intuitions generated by our theoretical results, we then went on to
devise a novel micro-storage strategy that allows an agent to optimise both its storage profile
and storage capacity in order to maximise its owner’s savings. Furthermore, we provided an
adaptive mechanism based on predicted market prices that allowed the agent to change its
strategy in response to changing market prices. Our empirical evaluation of this mechanism
on the UK electricity grid was then shown to cause the average storage profile to converge to
the theoretical competitive equilibrium. At that point, peak demands are reduced, reducing
the requirements for more costly and carbon-intensive generation plants. Moreover, in our
analysis of the grid efficiency at this equilibrium we show that, while being stable, it results
in reduced costs and carbon emissions. This also shows that the objective of buying storage
to save on electricity bills is generally aligned with maximising the grid efficiency (i.e.,
flattening the peaks in the demand). In particular, we show that, without the burden of
cost (e.g., if storage were completely subsidised), the population would adopt storage until
an equilibrium with 48% of the population adopting storage is reached and this is achieved
with a high level of domestic load factor (i.e. 0.91). Given this, we analysed the system
in a more realistic setting and empirically demonstrated that if costs of storage are not
sufficiently low, the system will not converge to an equilibrium with a high grid efficiency,
and if costs are simply too high, there will be no incentives even for the high-end electricity
users to adopt micro-storage.
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Figure 15: Evolutionary game-theoretic analysis for different costs of storage. Lines are
trajectories representing the evolution of the proportion of low-end and high-
end users adopting storage. The black dots are the Nash equilibria.
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Figure 16: Load factor for different proportions of low-end and high-end users adopting
storage.
In general, our theoretical and practical results provide fertile ground for research into
agent-based techniques that might be applied to manage demand in the smart grid. In
particular, demand-side management technologies (Hammerstrom et al., 2008), which in-
volve loads (e.g., washing machine or dishwasher) in a user’s home being automatically
scheduled to run at certain times, present similar properties to micro-storage in that they
allow energy to be moved around from peak to off-peak times in order to flatten demand
and reduce costs. Hence, applying a similar framework and strategies to ours, we could
expect analogous theoretical results and efficiency gains being predicted for deployments of
such technologies. Moreover, our techniques could be used to predict how demand would
generally vary across the day once real-time pricing is rolled out and in different regions
(populated by different proportions of low-end or high-end users), and this could help better
prepare assets (e.g., spinning reserve or strengthening transmission lines).
To generalise our techniques further, we intend to integrate more sophisticated models of
the electricity market mechanism into our work in order to better capture the price fluctua-
tions that can occur in real markets. For the theoretical analysis, we will turn to stochastic
processes, which are commonly used to model volatility in financial markets. Further, our
experiments can be extended by generating prices by drawing samples from suitable distri-
butions, or existing data points, or even by developing our simulations to include market
clearing with strategic bidding by energy suppliers and consumers. Accordingly, we also
intend to employ better forecasting models of demand and supply (e.g., using Gaussian pro-
cesses or other regression techniques) to predict prices in our optimisation model. Indeed,
so far we have assumed that agents predict prices simply from the previous days’ prices for
individual settlement periods. As shown by Wellman, Reeves, Lochner, and Vorobeychik
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(2004), agents can perform significantly differently if they adopt different approaches to
price prediction and therefore, to improve our empirical analysis, it will be interesting to
see how the grid performance and individual agents’ profits are affected as different agents
adopt different forecasting models. In particular, it will be important to determine how the
widespread adoption of micro-storage devices should affect the volatility of the wholesale
electricity market.
Furthermore, we intend to explore mechanisms that can ensure convergence towards the
equilibrium. In particular, our point of departure will be the theory of strategic behaviour
found in the Minority Game (Challet & Zhang, 1997), which shares similarities with our
problem, or using a more complex pricing mechanism where the consumers always play
their best response (Voice et al., 2011) such that a learning mechanism for the consumer
agent would not be required. As part of this work, we also intend to investigate the market
efficiency for different proportions of the population adopting micro-storage devices, and
whether the decrease in efficiency observed when the market is saturated was a by-product
of our adaptive mechanism which could be avoided.
Finally, we intend to consider the grid distribution network. Because peaks are different
across different nodes of the electricity network, more storage capacity might be required in
some areas than in others. Thus, we will investigate whether our agent-based micro-storage
management approach can be used to flatten peaks locally within a node of the electricity
network rather than flattening the aggregate demand profile of the grid.
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